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T HE UNITED STATES government is deeply involved
in the initiation, research, development, participation,
privatization and commercialization of outer space activi-
ties. In the entire history of this commitment to outer
space activity, there has never been one single fatality to
unrelated third persons. This phenomenal safety record
is probably unmatched in any comparable field involving
such potentially hazardous activity, and is a proud testi-
monial of the concern for human safety which is para-
mount to the United States space program. As in any
dangerous or potentially hazardous activity, however, an
accident of some type resulting in loss of life, injury or
danger always lurks as a tragic possibility. Given the ex-
tensive involvement of the United States government in
outer space activities, any such accident may be directly or
indirectly linked to the government.
This article will deal with United States involvement in
outer space activities, the parameters of United States lia-
bility under United States law, and the obstacles associ-
ated with seeking redress for injury, damages or death
from the federal government. Unfortunately, recovery for
damages, injuries or death from the United States under
GOVERNMENT LIABILITY
United States domestic tort law is fraught with barriers,
exceptions and loopholes which substantially limit any
possibility of recovery to specific narrowly-defined and
strictly-construed situations. As a result, United States
domestic law differs greatly from United States interna-
tional law regarding the liability of the United States gov-
ernment for outer space activities to persons damaged,
injured or killed. This disparity may lead to indefensible
absurd and unjust results; a foreign national may be able
to recover damages from the United States government
under international law, while American citizens may be
precluded from recovery under domestic law for injuries
arising out of the same occurrence.
I. UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN OUTER
SPACE ACTIVITIES
As of the beginning of 1984, the use of outer space has
resulted in 5,154 man-made objects orbiting the Earth.'
They consist of 1,324 Earth-orbiting payloads, fifty-nine
space probe payloads, 3,715 Earth-orbiting pieces of deb-
ris and fifty-six space probe pieces of debris. Of these, the
United States launched 452 payloads and thirty probe
pieces of payloads into orbit.2 Some estimates attribute at
least half of the orbiting United States payloads to the
military, although specific details are sketchy. The re-
maining United States payloads are of a civil nature,
either government, private or internationally owned or
operated, but all involve either direct or indirect United
States government participation.
A. Direct Participation
Before the United States government's first formal at-
tempt to build a rocket capable of launching satellites,3
a Corrigan, Outer Space Law - A Brief Review: How to go into Outer Space Legally, 28
TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 422, 424 (1984).
2 Id.
-1 The attempt was made to have a rocket-carrying satellite in time for the Inter-
national Geophysical Year, from July 1, 1957, through December 31, 1978, in
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government interest and involvement in space flight ex-
isted.4 Not until passage of the National Aeronautics and
Space Act of 1958, 5 however, did a centralized civil gov-
ernment agency with its own budgetary demands and con-
gressional mandate exist to exercise control over
astronautical activities sponsored by the United States.6
This agency, the well-known National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA), is responsible for the ad-
ministration and execution of United States space activi-
ties, except for those activities involving the development
of weapons systems, military operations and other tradi-
tional national defense activities left to the United States
Department of Defense. NASA's role is intended to
insure
that the United States activities in space shall be devoted
to peaceful purposes for the benefit of mankind, and that
such activities be conducted so as to contribute materially
to the expansion of human knowledge of phenomena in
the atmosphere and space, performance, speed, safety,
and efficiency of aeronautical and space vehicles, and the
development and operation of vehicles capable of carrying
instruments, equipment, supplies, and living organisms
through space.7
In addition, Congress directed NASA to preserve the role
of the United States as a leader in aeronautical and space
science and technology; to make available to defense
agencies any discoveries of military value and significance;
to cooperate with other nations in aeronautics and space
order to observe sunspot activity. This attempt culminated in the Vanguard test
satellite, developed by the Navy, and a three-pound payload, which ultimately
ended in failure.
I See generally, R. HIRSCH & J. TRENTO, THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE
ADMINISTRATION 3-21 (1973) [hereinafter cited as HIRSCH & TRENTO]; C. CORLIS,
NASA SOUNDING ROCKETS 1958-68 (1971).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2451-84 (1982).
, NASA's predecessor, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
(NACA), while primarily devoted to aviation, was involved in astronautics. How-
ever, "it lived most its official life in the shadow cast by the military services
. ." HIRSCH & TRENTO, supra note 4, at 30.
7 HIRSCH & TRENTO, supra note 4, at 40-41 (paraphrasing 42 U.S.C. § 2451
(1982)).
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work; and to cooperate with other agencies in order to
avoid unnecessary duplication.8
NASA space activities through the years are too numer-
ous to list, ranging from simple ionospheric sounding
rockets to complex manned missions. One of the more
famous programs was the Apollo program, itself the final
product of earlier efforts from the Mercury and Gemini
flights. The Apollo program resulted in Apollo 11 astro-
naut Neil Armstrong walking on the Moon on July 21,
1969. Other well-known NASA programs include the
SKYLAB program,9  interplanetary probes launched
through the years,' 0 the Shuttle program," and the pro-
posed permanent manned orbiting space station pro-
gram. 12 Other areas of astronautics in which NASA has
played or is playing key roles include research and devel-
opment in expendable launch vehicles, communications
satellites, navigational satellites, remote sensing satellites,
meteorological satellites and various military missions. 13
* 42 U.S.C. § 2451(c).
* SKYLAB was the United States' first manned space station which was in oper-
ation for about nine months in 1973 and 1974. It was used to study the long-term
effects of living and working in space and to conduct scientific investigations.
GEORGE C. MARSHALL SPACE CENTER, NASA SKYLAB, OUR FIRST SPACE STATION
(Leland F. Belew 1977); Newkirk & Ertel, Skylab, A Chronology, NASA SP-4011
(1977). On July 11, 1979, SKYLAB's orbit decayed to where it reentered the
Earth's atmosphere. Debris was scattered along a path across the Indian Ocean
and Australia.
10 Mariner, Viking and Pioneer spacecraft have been used on these missions
with enormous success. See generally FIMMEL, VAN ALLEN, & BURGESS, PIONEER,
FIRST TO JUPITER, SATURN AND BEYOND (1980); MURRAY & BURGESS, FLIGHT TO
MERCURY (1977); EZELL, ON MARS, EXPLORATION OF THE RED PLANET (1984); NA-
TIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION, MARINER-VENUS 1967 FINAL
PROJECT REPORT (1971); TUCKER, VIKING LANDER IMAGINING INVESTIGATION,
NASA Reference Publication 1007 (1978).
1 See generally KAPLAN, SPACE SHUTrLE, AMERICA'S WINGS TO THE FUTURE (2d
ed. 1983).
12 On January 25, 1984, President Reagan initiated the space station program
during his State of the Union Address to a joint session of Congress, when he
directed NASA to develop a permanently-manned space station within a decade.
See generally T. SIMPSON, THE SPACE STATION, AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME
(1985).
I., See generally NASA, AERONAUTICS AND SPACE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT -
1984 ACTIVITIES; see also Corault, Station Stretch, Orbital Vehicle Highlight NASAs
Fund Bid, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Feb. 1I, 1985, at 25, 26.
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NASA's space tracking and data systems provide tracking,
control, telemetry and data support for a myriad of outer
space activities. NASA also has been active in materials
processing in space, 14 satellite maintenance and satellite
retrieval operations. ' 5
In addition, NASA has been very active in launching
foreign payloads and international joint space ventures in-
volving numerous countries. Some of the more notable
examples include SPACELAB, the reusable laboratory
designed, developed and funded by the European Space
Agency (ESA) and proposed ESA participation in the
United States space station program.' 6 While a complete
survey of NASA activities would be too voluminous to un-
dertake here, it suffices to say that NASA is directly or in-
directly involved in the vast majority of United States
outer space activities.
The remainder of United States space activities not car-
ried out exclusively or in part by NASA are undertaken by
the Department of Defense (DOD), which conducts its
own space projects. The Defense Department uses outer
space for national strategic defense. While the military
does make public an official list of military launchings,
such lists often provide very few details of the specific mis-
sions and include only the vague mandatory reports re-
quired by the Registration Convention. 7
14 Contamination-free hormones and crystals grown from vapor are but a few of
the recent successful applications. See, e.g., Flight Produces Contamination-Free Hor-
mone, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Apr. 22, 1985, at 22; May 6, 1985, at 18.
1-1 Marsh, Satellite Retrieval Succeeds Despite Equipment Problem, Av. WEEK & SPACE
TECH., Nov. 19, 1984, at 16; Astronauts Deploy, Retrieve Satellites, Av. WEEK & SPACE
TECH., Nov. 26, 1984, at 20; Covault, USAF, NASA Discuss Shuttle Use for Satellite
Maintenance, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Dec. 17, 1984, at 14.
16 Europe's Station Participation Viewed as Step Toward Own Facility, Av. WEEK &
SPACE TECH., June 3, 1985, at 149.
17 Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space,
openedfor signature Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. No. 8480, entered intoforce
Sept. 15, 1976. Article IV sets forth the vague reporting requirements which in-
clude only the name of the launching State or States, appropriate designation of
the space object or its registration number, date and territory or location of
launch, and basic orbital parameters. This information is required to be reported
"as soon as practicable." See Article IV. With regard to launches of short orbital
GOVERNMENT LIABILITY
B. Indirect Participation
United States space activities inextricably involve the
private sector. However, government policy, control and
supervision predominates in this area - a phenomenon
not unexpected in view of the enormous costs and high
risks involved. Gradually, the United States is transferring
certain traditionally governmental activities to the private
sector, with the government maintaining only a regulatory
role. This transfer to the private sector is consistent with
a policy which has evolved through the years, whereby the
government (often NASA) conducts early research, devel-
opment and deployment of outer space prototypes
through the use of government funding and private con-
tractors. After the feasibility of prototypes has been
demonstrated, private industry takes over the actual
"business" concerned.
An example of the shift of governmental activities to the
private sector occurred when NASA largely phased out
the development of communications satellites from its op-
erations, and allowed private entities to take over the
field.' 8 This shifting of activities to the private sector also
is happening with the LANDSAT program, where, pursu-
ant to the Land-Remote Sensing Commercialization Act,' 9
the Commerce Department is attempting to transfer civil
remote sensing activities to the private sector.2z Similarly,
in 1983, President Reagan adopted as a national policy
the privatization/commercialization of expendable launch
vehicles (ELVs). 2 ' This policy applies to both those ELVs
previously developed for United States government use,
duration, "as soon as practicable" often has been interpreted to mean weeks or
months after the satellite has returned to earth. Id.
18 PARDOE, THE FUTURE OF SPACE TECHNOLOGY 177 (1984).
'- 15 U.S.C. §§ 4201-92 (1982).
20 Seven bidders entered competition in 1984 for the transfer contract which is
now being negotiated with the winner, Earth Observing Satellite Co. (EOSAT), a
joint venture of RCA Astro-Electronics and Hughes Aircraft Co. OMB Approves
Funds to Shift Landsat to Private Sector, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., May 27, 1985, at
19.
2 ASDD-94, see White House Press Release, May 16, 1983.
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as well as new space launch systems developed specifically
for commercial applications.
The government continues to play a prominent role as
a regulator, however, despite the increasing privatization
or commercialization of traditional governmental activi-
ties. Regulation is particularly necessary in the expenda-
ble launch vehicle industry because the potential for
disaster appears to be very great. Consequently, safety
considerations demand particular scrutiny. Additionally,
under the Liability Convention,22 to which the United
States is a state party, the United States, not private
launch entities, agreed to assume international liability for
damage caused by United States space objects in a variety
of circumstances, including absolute liability for damage
to life and property caused by a space object launched
from United States territory or by a launch otherwise con-
ducted or procured by the United States or United States
nationals. 23 During the 1983 Institute of Space Law Col-
loquium in Budapest, Hungary, Neil S. Hosenball, NASA
General Counsel, reaffirmed this responsibility pursuant
to the Outer Space Treaty.24 In a paper which lacked the
usual disclaimers and which clearly characterized itself as
"a work of the U.S. government," he stated:
Article VI and Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty appear
to place responsibility on a party to the treaty for the space
activities of its nationals irrespective of the place from
which a launch might occur. Thus, the United States is
responsible for supervision and authorization of a United States
company launching into space from outside U.S territory. 25
22 Convention on International Liability for Damages Caused by Space Objects,
opened for signature Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, entered into
force Sept. 15, 1976.
". Id. at Art. I(c), II.
24 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for
signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205, en-
tered into force Oct. 19, 1967 [hereinafter cited as OST].
25 N. Hosenball, The Law Applicable to the Use of Space for Coomercial ActiVities, PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SIXI'II COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE
(1984).
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This direct liability forms an additional basis for a broad
federal interest "which extends beyond safety issues" in
private space launch activities.26
Between 1980 and 1982, an American firm, Space Serv-
ices Incorporated of America (SSI), twice petitioned the
United States government for approval to launch a private
rocket from a private launch site.27 From these petitions
came the realization that the United States government
lacked regulations tailored to commercial launch vehi-
cles.28 No agency had primary responsibility for licensing
private launch activities. As a result, SSI had to contact
numerous federal agencies to determine which agencies
had regulatory jurisdiction over ELV launches. In addi-
tion, since no existing regulations clearly applied to pri-
vate ELV launches, the State Department decided to
define launches as "exports" and utilize the International
Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR)29 as an interim means
to discharge the federal government's international and
domestic legal obligations in authorizing proposed
launches.3 0  For the first commercial applicant, however,
compliance with the ITAR process proved lengthy, ex-
pensive and complicated, with some federal agencies
questioning whether private launches were even
26 Notice of Policy and Request for Comments, Licensing Process for Commer-
cial Space Launch Activities, 50 Fed. Reg. 7,717 (1985).
27 SSI's launch approval requests for its Percheron and Conestoga I rockets
stimulated the creation of the regulatory process. For an excellent review of the
process, see S. Chafer, Federal Regulation of the First U.S. Private Rocket
Launch: Right on Down the Regulatory Pike (Nov. 4, 1984) (winning paper in
Robert H. Goddard Historical Essay Competition, sponsored by the National
Space Club).
28 Since then, another private company, Starstruck, has sought and obtained
launch approval from the United States government to launch its privately-devel-
oped ELV, the Dolphin, from a platform in international waters. Although two
attempts were aborted, Starstruck continues launch efforts. See Webber, Launching
the Rocket Industry in the United States: Domestic Regulation of Private Expendable Launch
Vehicles, 50J. AIR L. & COM. 1, 3 (1984).
21. 22 C.F.R. § 121.01 (1984). Included on the munitions list are rockets, launch
vehicles and associated equipment. Id.
30 See H. Schmidt, Regulatory Aspects of Commercial Space Transportation
(Nov. 4, 1984) (the author is Senior Regulatory Specialist, Office of Commercial
Space Transportation, and delivered this speech to the JANNAF Safety and Envi-
ronmental Subcommittee at the Kennedy Space Center, Florida).
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permissible.'
In May, 1983, President Reagan announced that the
United States government fully endorses the commerciali-
zation of United States ELVs and will facilitate that pro-
cess.3 2 The announced policy also outlined regulatory
guidelines for the process:
The U.S. Government will license, supervise, and/or regu-
late U.S. commercial ELV operations only to the extent
required to meet national and international obligations
and to ensure public safety. Commercial ELV operators
must comply with the applicable international, national
and local laws and regulations including security, safety,
and environmental requirements.
The U.S. Government encourages the use of its national
ranges for U.S. commercial ELV operations. Commercial
launch operations conducted from a national range will, at
a minimum, be subject to existing range regulations and
requirements.
The U.S. Government will encourage free market com-
petition among the various systems and concepts within
the private sector. The U.S. Government will review and
approve any proposed commercial launch facility and
range as well as subsequent operations conducted
therefrom.
To implement these and other policy decisions, Presi-
dent Reagan in November, 1983, designated the Depart-
ment of Transportation (DOT) as the lead agency for
commercial launch activities. 4 By executive order35
signed in February, 1984, the President directed the DOT
as lead agency to:
provide leadership in expedit[ing] the processing of pri-
vate sector [license applications] . . . for commercial ELV
Id.
12 Expendable Launch Vehicles, Announcement of United States Government
Support for Commercial Operations by the Private Sector, Administration of
President Reagan, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 721 (May 16, 1985).
-4 Schmidt, supra note 30.
.44 Id.
.- Exec. Order No. 12,465, 49 Fed. Reg. 7,211 (1984).
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launches and the establishment and operation of commer-
cial launch ranges; consult with other affected agencies to
promote consistent application of ELV licensing require-
ments for the private sector, and assure fair and equitable
treatment for all private sector applicants; serve as a single
point of contact for collection and dissemination of docu-
mentation related to commercial ELV licensing applica-
tions; [and] identify Federal statutes, treaties, regulations,
and policies which may have an adverse impact on ELV
commercialization efforts and recommend appropriate
changes to affected agencies ... 6
After its own extensive study and analysis, Congress en-
acted the Commercial Space Launch Act,37 which Presi-
dent Reagan signed into law on October 30, 1984. This
Act provided the statutory basis for the exercise of the
lead agency function by the DOT, 3 and vested exclusive
licensing authority for commercial space launches and op-
eration of commercial launch sites in the DOT. At the
same time, the Commercial Space Launch Act preserved
the licensing authority of the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) relative to the communication compo-
nents of launch vehicles, preserving the independent li-
censing authority of both the FCC and Department of
Commerce with respect to communications and private
sector remote sensing payloads.3
9
In accordance with the Commercial Space Launch Act,
the DOT published a Notice 40 to be relied upon as interim
guidance pending the promulgation of formal regulations
implementing the licensing provisions of the Act. Under
this Notice, the "DOT's principal objective is to shape, in
s6 Id.
17 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-23 (West Supp. 1985).
'1 It should be emphasized that the Commercial Space Launch Act applies only
to private launch activities; government launch activities are exempt.
- 49 U.S.C.A. § 2605 (West Supp. 1985).
40 DOT, Commercial Space Transportation Licensing Process for Commercial
Space and Launch Activities Notice of Policy and Request for Comments, 50 Fed.
Reg. 7,714 (1985). This Notice contains the foundation of the regulatory struc-
ture for commercial space activities. Id. DOT currently is developing the specific
requirements to be integrated with particular emphasis on launch license regula-
tion, insurance regulation and national range use. Id.
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consultation with other appropriate Federal agencies, a
streamlined licensing process that protects public safety,
national security and foreign policy objectives, but poses
no unreasonable regulatory barriers to the commercial
success of a technologically innovative private space
launch industry in the United States."'" To meet these
objectives, the DOT has developed a dual licensing pro-
cess composed of a mission review and a launch safety re-
view. Although the mission review will address certain
characteristics of the launch such as the flight plan, it will
substantially involve the payload.
The payload review can occur in one of two ways. If the
payload must be licensed by another Federal agency, such
as telecommunications satellites licensed by the Federal
Communications Commission or private operational re-
mote sensing satellites licensed by the Department of
Commerce, DOT would not duplicate the review under-
taken in the course of the license process conducted by
such agency. Rather DOT will accept the license so issued
as satisfying the requirements of mission review pertaining
to the payload.
Payloads which are not independently licensed will be
reviewed by DOT in consultation with the Departments of
State and Defense, and, as appropriate, the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration and other agencies to
ensure that the payload mission does not conflict with na-
tional interests.42
The launch safety review will focus upon the safety ele-
ments of the launch operation and the safety systems of
the vehicle, including such factors as the proposed launch
site and flight corridor, range safety expertise, ground
and flight safety process and procedures, range tracking
and instrumentation capability, vehicle safety system, and
proposed vehicle design.4" However, reliability of the ve-
hicle in a non-safety context will be the responsibility of
41 Id.
42 Id. at 7,717.
4.4 Id.
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the launch vehicle manufacturers. 44 The launch safety re-
view will deal primarily with the range and vehicle safety
resources an applicant has put in place to guarantee that
the launch operations are conducted safely.
The Commercial Space Launch Act also contains provi-
sions requiring that the Secretary of Transportation con-
sult with other appropriate federal agencies in the course
of overseeing and coordinating space activities.4 5 The
Secretary should eliminate any duplicative or unnecessary
licensing processes required by other agencies.46 In the
case of disagreement between agencies, the Secretary of
Transportation shall have the ultimate authority to estab-
lish the regulatory framework.4 7
Many other federal agencies have direct interest in the
regulation and supervision of space activities. Any outer
space rocket initially must travel through airspace. The
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has the duty to
maintain the safety and efficient utilization of such air-
space.4 8 Consequently, any rocket launching would in-
volve the FAA. Part 101, Subpart C of the Federal
Aviation Regulations (FARs)49 contains the only regula-
tions clearly applicable to rocket launches. While these
regulations were adopted in 1963 for the purpose of en-
suring that small rockets launched by hobbyists and scien-
tists would not interfere with aircraft operations, the FAA
regards these regulations as applicable to commercial or-
bital and suborbital launches.50 Substantive limitations
regarding rocket launches are set forth in the FARs:
No person may operate an unmanned rocket-
44 Id.
4-, 49 U.S.C.A. § 2604 (West Supp. 1985).
46 Id.
47 S. REP. No. 656, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1984).
48 See 49 U.S.C. § 1348(a) (1982).
49 14 C.F.R. §§ 101.21-.25 (1985).
- Myers, Federal Government Regulation of Commercial Operations Using' EXpendable
Launch Vehicles, FIRST ABA FORUM COMMITrEE ON AIR & SPACE LAW (1984); Dula,
The People of the U.S.A. and the USSR Must Work Together to Establish a Space
Industry, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SIXTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER
SPACE 309, 313 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Dula].
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(a) In a manner that creates a collision hazard with other
aircraft;
(b) In controlled airspace;
(c) Within five miles of the boundary of any airport;
(d) At any altitude where clouds or obscuring phenomena
of more than five-tenths coverage prevails;
(e) At any altitude where the horizontal visibility is less
than five miles;
(f) Into any cloud;
(g) Within 1,500 feet of any person or property that is not
associated with the operations; or
(h) Between sunset and sunrise. 5'
Since 'any rocket launch from the continental United
States will involve an intrusion into controlled airspace,52
prohibited under this section, a waiver 53 or exemption
54
from the FAA is required. The FAA has used both waiv-
ers and exemptions. Waiver involves a much shorter re-
view period.5 5 Rocket launches from government ranges,
like Kennedy Space Center and Vandenburg Air Force
Base, are not subject to these FARs 56 because the airspace
above government ranges is restricted airspace.57
The Federal Communication Commission (FCC) is also
involved in outer space activities. It controls the alloca-
tion of radio frequencies which are essential to the control
of unmanned rockets and payloads. 58  The FCC also es-
tablishes frequencies for satellite communications. Com-
munications are essential for monitoring, telemetry, radar
51 14 C.F.R. § 101.23 (1985). See also id. at § 101.25 for the requirements asso-
ciated with notification of a rocket launch to the nearest FAA Air Traffic Control
Facility.
5 See 14 C.F.R. § 71.7 (1985). See generally id. at §§ 71.1-19 (designation of
federal airways including control zones, control areas and the continental control
area).
55 A waiver permits a private entity to conduct a one-time flight test from a
specified facility. Webber, supra note 28, at 12.
54 An exemption represents an FAA determination that the proposed activity is
not governed by FAA regulations. Webber, supra note 28, at 12 n.57.
5' Webber, supra note 28, at 24.
Id.; 14 C.F.R. §§ 73.1-.85 (1985).
57 Myers, supra note 50, at 4; Webber, supra note 28, at 13.
51 Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1982 & Supp. I
1983).
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tracking and, if required, abort or destruct capability.
Consequently, for any launch to operate, it is necessary to
apply to the FCC for a radio operator's license and fre-
quency assignments.
FCC reviews related to outer space activities appear to
be restricted to communications issues such as interfer-
ence and efficient use of the radio spectrum.5 9 The FCC
has determined that Experimental Radio Services regula-
tions60 apply to commercial launch operators. Under
these regulations, radio station authorizations are
granted for two years, with frequencies available on a
shared basis which may be limited to a specific geographi-
cal area.
The Departments of State and Defense also are keenly
interested in launch vehicle activities. The International
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR),61 lists as subject to
export controls (the United States munitions list) all
launch vehicles except meteorological sounding rockets,
which are regulated by the Commerce Department. Ap-
proval criteria 62 for temporary export licenses include, in-
ter alia, the furtherance of world peace, United States
security and foreign policy considerations, and approval
by the Director of the United States Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency.63  ITAR applies when United
States commercial launch vehicles are used to launch pay-
loads from foreign countries, because these launches re-
quire export licenses.
Many Defense Department agencies also would be in-
volved in space launchings, both to protect the Nation's
security interests and for space traffic control. The Air
Force, through NORAD/Space Command, is responsible
for space traffic monitoring to avoid collisions between
Myers, supra note 50, at 10.
47 C.F.R. §§ 5.1-.4111 (1985). Broadcast regulations are the sole exception.
Id.
(11 22 C.F.R. §§ 121-130 (1985).
62 Id.; 22 C.F.R. § 123.05.
1) 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1982).
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orbiting satellites.64 Defense Department officials believe
that they will assume a service-oriented role, in addition
to their space defense role, as space traffic increases.65 In
addition, NORAD would have the responsibility to warn
the Soviet Union if a rocket strays into Soviet territory or
the territory of its interests.
Other federal agencies which regulate space activities
include the Department of Commerce, the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the
National Bureau of Standards (NBS), the National Tele-
communications and Information Administration (NTIA),
the Coast Guard, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department
of the Interior, and the Occupational Safety & Health Ad-
ministration (OSHA).
The foregoing review of United States government di-
rect and indirect regulation of outer space activities,
though incomplete, shows that even space activities con-
ducted by private entities will involve the United States
government to some extent.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The doctrine of sovereign immunity protects sover-
eigns from suit in domestic and foreign courts without the
sovereign's consent. This concept was adopted in the
United States during the nineteenth century. 66 Courts de-
veloped the doctrine relying on the theory that the king
was immune from suit; that the king can do no wrong. 67 It
is curious that a legal system based on democracy rather
Dula, supra note 50, at 323.
'; Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Mar. 28, 1983, at 56-57. Colonel Gerald M. May,
Director of Space Operations for Space Command, has said, "In order for us to
keep everything separated in space, we are going to become the traffic cop .... I
don't see any other nation coming forward to do that so it will rest with us." Id.
1r Krist, jury Trial and the Federal 7ort Claims Act: Time to Recognize the Seventh
Amendment Right, 58 TEX. L. REv. 549, 551 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Krist].
.;7 Id. at 553; 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 25.01-.17 (1958).
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than feudalism or monarchism adopted such reasoning.
68
The doctrine has eroded over the years with the crea-
tion of a number of statutory waivers of sovereign immu-
nity.69 However, because any suit against the United
States government is an exception to the broad immunity
traditionally enjoyed by the United States, waivers of the
federal government's sovereign immunity are strictly con-
strued by the courts and filled with restrictions and limita-
tions. Consequently, the United States's potential liability
for outer space activities must be carefully analyzed, not
only with reference to common law tort principles, but
also with reference to specific congressional waivers of
sovereign immunity.
The modern American version of the sovereign immu-
nity doctrine states that the United States, by reason of its
sovereignty, is immune from suit and can be sued only
with its own consent; 70 a court has no jurisdiction over a
suit against the United States unless the government has
consented. 7' This immunity exists whatever the character
of the proceeding or the right to be enforced, 72 and it ap-
plies both to causes of action arising from acts of Con-
gress and from violations of rights conferred by the
Constitution.7 3
Sovereign immunity can be waived and consent to suit
can be given only by an act of Congress. 4 Consent must
be given clearly, expressly and explicitly. Such consent
may not be implied or inferred from an ambiguous stat-
6 Krist, supra note 66, at 553. See also Davis, Sovereign Immunity Must Go, 22 AD.
L. REV. 383 (1970).
69 Id.
70 See National City Bank of New York v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 359
(1955); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141 (1950). See generally 91 C.J.S.
UNITED STATES §§ 175-210.
71 United States v. Alabama, 313 U.S. 274, 281 (1941).
12 Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 581-82 (1934); Hobby v. Hodges, 215
F.2d 754, 757 (10th Cir. 1954).
7. Id. at 758.
74 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 27-28 (1953); Malman v. United
States, 207 F.2d 897, 898 (2d Cir. 1953).
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ute.7 5 As with the construction of statutes generally, legis-
lative intent must be ascertained and given effect to
determine whether Congress purported to waive immu-
nity and to consent to suit against the United States.76
While it has been held generally that a statute which con-
tains a waiver of sovereign immunity is to be strictly con-
strued in favor of the United States and not to be
extended beyond its plain language, 77 the rules of con-
struction are not to be applied to defeat the aim and pur-
pose of the statute.7 8 Therefore, an adoption by Congress
of broad statutory language when authorizing suit against
the United States should not be limited by unduly narrow
or restrictive interpretations.79
When waiving sovereign immunity, Congress may im-
pose any conditions, restrictions or limitations it deems
necessary to maintain a cause of action against the United
States, including how, when and where the suit may be
maintained.80 Such conditions must be followed strictly
and cannot be waived, for they define the jurisdiction of a
court to hear such actions.8' While it has been stated that
the United States "is in no different position from any
other party" when sued pursuant to a waiver of sovereign
immunity, 82 an analysis of the statutory waivers of sover-
eign immunity and their practical applications reveal a
contrary reality. Since Congress has imposed conditions
and restrictions on when the United States can be sued
successfully, the United States enjoys a plethora of privi-
leges placing it in a far more advantageous position than
"any other party" when defending against tort claims.
7- General Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States, 119 F. Supp. 352, 354 (N.D.N.Y.
1953).
7" Cohen v. United States, 195 F.2d 1019, 1021 (2d Cir. 1952).
Hobby v. Hodges, 215 F.2d at 758.
, Herren v. Farm Sec. Admin., 153 F.2d 76, 78 (8th Cir. 1946).
71, Canadian Aviator v. United States, 324 U.S. 215, 222 (1945).
go United States v. Alberty, 63 F.2d 965, 966 (10th Cir. 1933).
"I Munro v. United States, 303 U.S. 36, 41 (1938); United States v. Acord, 209
F.2d 709, 712 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 975 (1954); Bachman, Emmerich &
Co., Inc. v. United States, 21 F. Supp. 682, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
' Henz v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 291, 294 (N.D. Cal. 1949).
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III. LIABILITY UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
- SUBSTANTIVE PROVISION
Perhaps the broadest waiver of sovereign immunity and
the most important national remedy available for persons
suffering injury arising out of the tortious conduct of the
United States government is the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA).83 The FTCA gives federal district courts
exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the
United States, for money damages . . . for injury or loss
of property, or personal injury or death caused by the neg-
ligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment, under circumstances where the United
States, ifa private person, would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred. 84
The FTCA has been construed as "a broad waiver of the
federal government's immunity . . . for the torts of its
employees while acting in the scope of their em-
ployment."85
A. Substantive Limitations
The FTCA will be applicable to claims for redress for
damages, injuries or death arising out of direct or indirect
United States outer space activities.86 While courts have
83 Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. §§ 2621-80 (1982)).
84 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982) (emphasis added).
-5 Fitch v. United States, 513 F.2d 1013, 1015 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
866 (1975).
8, See generally United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 159 (1963) (Court held that
prisoners sustaining injuries because of government employees' negligence could
maintain suits under the FTCA, noting that the Act extends to novel and unprece-
dented forms of liability); Rayonier Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957)
(Court held that United States could be liable under FTCA for losses resulting
from negligence of United States Forest Service in fighting a forest fire, noting
that one purpose of the Act was to establish novel and unprecedented govern-
ment liability); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69 (1955) (Court
held that once Coast Guard undertook to provide lighthouse service it had a duty
to maintain it, and persons incurring damage as a result of Coast Guard's breach
of that duty had cause of action under FTCA).
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stated that the FTCA equates the liability of the United
States "to that which a 'private individual' would have
'under like circumstances,'- '87 and while the FTCA
plainly states, "[t]he United States shall be liable, respect-
ing the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances,"' 88 the United States has enormous ad-
vantages not afforded to private litigants. Such advan-
tages can serve to preclude recovery by claimants for
damages to which they otherwise would be entitled under
well recognized tort principles.
The federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction
over claims arising pursuant to the FTCA89 and are re-
quired to apply the "whole law" of the state where the
tortious act or omission occurred, including that state's
conflict of laws rules.90 However, regardless of the con-
tent of the "whole law" of the state, the federal govern-
ment retains certain distinct privileges. With regard to
outer space activities, the most important of these privi-
leges is that the FTCA does not permit claims against the
government based upon strict or absolute liability theo-
ries such as products liability, ultrahazardous activities or
inherently dangerous activities.9 ' Negligence must be
pleaded and proven. Although the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-
tur has been applied to some FTCA claims,92 the necessity
81 Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62, 73 (D.C. Cir. 1955)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (1948)), revd sub nor. on other grounds, United
States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907, modified on other grounds, 350 U.S. 962
(1956).
88 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982) (emphasis added).
- 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
-o Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. I, I, 14 (1962).
ul See Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972) (upholding principle that FTCA does
not authorize suits against the government on claims of strict or absolute liability
for ultrahazardous activity); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 1545 (1953) (hold-
ing that the FTCA requires a negligent act and that no liability arises under abso-
lute liability theory); Toppi v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 513, 518 (E.D. Pa.
1971) (noting that the FTCA does not lift governmental immunity for theories of
liability without fault).
1"2 Res ipsa loquitur can be applied in FTCA actions only if the doctrine is recog-
nized under the jurisdiction whose applicable law governs. See D'Anna v. United
States, 181 F.2d 335, 337 (4th Cir. 1950) (court applied res ipsa loquitur to situation
GOVERNMENT LIABILITY
of proving actual negligence cannot be overemphasized as
a significant obstacle to recovery for injuries or damages
proximately caused by United States government outer
space activities.
In Laird v. Nelms,9" an action brought pursuant to the
FTCA seeking recovery for damages caused by a military
sonic airplane boom, the United States Supreme Court
held that the government would not be liable in the ab-
sence of negligence or a wrongful act. The Court rea-
soned that the statutory language "negligent or wrongful
act or omission of any employee of the Government" cre-
ates a uniform federal limitation on the types of acts com-
mitted by government employees for which the United
States has consented to be sued, and that any inclusion of
theories of recovery based other than on fault principles
would broaden the FTCA beyond the intent of Con-
gress.94 Consequently, actions based upon theories other
than negligence, such as strict or absolute liability, cannot
be brought under the FTCA.
Justice Stewart dissented from the majority opinion in
Laird, arguing that a rigid rule against FTCA recovery
based upon absolute liability undermines the basic ration-
ale upon which Congress premised the FTCA - liability
when a private person would be liable.95 Justice Stewart's
where auxiliary gas tank fell from naval airplane injuring plaintiff); Swanson v.
United States, 229 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Cal. 1964) (applying res ipsa loquitur to reach
the conclusion that government's negligence was cause of plane crash); see gener-
ally 35 AM. JUR. 2D Federal Tort Claims Act §§ 87-90 (1985).
93 406 U.S. 797 (1972).
- Id. at 799.
9-1 Id. at 803. Justice Stewart stated:
The rule announced by the Court today seems to me contrary to the
whole policy of the Tort Claims Act. For the doctrine of absolute
liability is applicable not only to sonic booms, but to other activities
that the Government carries on in common with many private citi-
zens. Absolute liability for injury caused by the concussion or debris
from dynamite blasting, for example, is recognized by an over-
whelming majority of state courts. A private person who detonates
an explosion in the process of building a road is liable for injuries to
others caused thereby under the law of most States even though he
took all practicable precautions to prevent such injuries, on the
sound principle that he who creates such a hazard should make good
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remarks are particularly applicable to United States gov-
ernment involvement in outer space activities. If the
FTCA is construed under existing precedent to preclude
strict or absolute liability recovery from the United States
government for a disaster occurring in the United States
as a result of United States outer space activities, unjust
and inequitable results may follow. Consider the follow-
ing hypothetical example: The United States attempts to
launch a spacecraft into outer space, but due to unexplained
causes the spacecraft crashes into the United States. No
''negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee
of the government" can be proven. A and B are both in-
jured in A's home. A is a United States citizen. B is a for-
eign citizen. B brings his action pursuant to the Liability
Convention where absolute liability is applicable. A is
precluded from bringing his action pursuant to the Liabil-
ity Convention, 96 so he brings his action pursuant to the
FTCA and is precluded from recovery because he cannot
prove negligence. B recovers from the United States for
his injuries; A does not recover because of his inability to
plead and prove negligence.
In addition, the federal government is not obligated to
pay pre-judgment interest and is not liable for punitive
damages regardless of its degree of recklessness or culpa-
bility9 7 (even if otherwise applicable state law provides for
the harm that results. Yet if employees of the United States engage
in exactly the same conduct with an identical result, the United
States will not, under the principle announced by the Court today,
be liable to the injured party. Nothing in the language or the legisla-
tive history of the Act compels such a result, and we should not
lightly conclude that Congress intended to create a situation so
much at odds with common sense and the basic rationale of the Act.
Id. at 809.
96. Convention on International Liability for Damages Caused by Space Objects,
opened for signature Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. 7762, entered into force
Oct. 9, 1973. Article II of the Liability Convention states: "A launching State
shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space object
on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft in flight." Id. (emphasis added). Under
Article VII, the Liability Convention is not applicable to nationals of the launching
state.
,7 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982). See, e.g., Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. United
States, 471 F. Supp. 1186 (E.D. Cal. 1979) (court held that railroad's claim for loss
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pre-judgment interest or punitive damages). Conse-
quently, delay works in favor of the government:
[if] a five-year delay occurs between the date of loss and
the date of the trial or settlement, claimants may lose as
much as 65% in cumulative prejudgment interest alone.
In addition, claimants may lose as much as 50% of the real
value of the dollars which they ultimately receive (five
years later) due to inflation and the consequent decline of
the purchasing value of the dollar.9 8
Furthermore, in a case brought under the FTCA, a
claimant does not have the right to a trial by jury.99
Claimants may request only that an advisory jury be em-
paneled to assist the judge in determining questions of
fact.' 00 The claim must be for money damages for death,
personal injury or property injury caused by a negligent
act or omission.' 0t Injunctive or other equitable relief is
not recognized under the FTCA.' °2
B. Applicable Law and Venue
The statutory choice of law directive contained in 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b) 10 3 raises interesting and novel issues
when applied to United States involvement in outer space
activity. In assessing liability of the United States, courts
traditionally have applied the substantive law of the state
where the act or omission occurred. Because of the pres-
ent "earth-based" nature of outer space activity, the inju-
rious space operation most likely will be traced to an
earth-based act or omission. As Mr. Peter Nesgos co-
of use of corporate capital was, in effect, a claim for pre-judgment interest and
thus was barred by the FTCA).
98 Tompkins, Litigation of an Airplane Hull Suit Against the United States of America,
1983 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 329, 334.
- 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1982); See Honeycutt v. United States, 19 F.R.D. 229, 230-
31 (W.D. La. 1956).
Schetter v. Housing Auth., 132 F. Supp. 149, 154 (W.D. Pa. 1955).
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
02 Midwest Growers Coop. Corp. v. Kirkemo, 533 F.2d 455, 465 (9th Cir.
1976).
. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982). Section 1346(b) directs courts to apply the sub-
stantive "law of the place where the act or omission occurred." Id.
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gently states, "In point of fact, it may be argued that al-
most every operation in outer space is traceable or linked
with ground-based functions.' ' 4 When the act or omis-
sion can be traced to some place within the United States
or United States territory, the substantive law of the locus
of such act or omission, including its choice of law rules,
will apply, regardless of whether the actual injuries occur
in international waters, 0 5 outer space or a foreign
country. '0
6
Conversely, no statutory directive exists as to the con-
trolling substantive law if the acts or omissions causing
the injuries, damages or death are solely attributable to,
and located in, outer space. However, the absence of
such a congressional mandate should not defeat otherwise
actionable claims if the act or omission complained of is
attributable to United States personnel, registered space
vehicles or space objects. 10 7
Under Articles VII and VIII of the Outer Space Treaty,
the United States has agreed to retain jurisdiction over its
own persons and objects in outer space, on the moon and
on other celestial bodies. The fact that these areas have
no sovereign should not defeat United States sovereignty
over, and responsibility for, United States registered vehi-
cles and personnel in outer space. Courts have applied
the FTCA, or admiralty jurisdiction where applicable, to
104 P. Nesgos, National Law and Commercial Activities in Outer Space 11l
(Sept. 1982) (unpublished thesis) [hereinafter cited as Nesgos].
105 Courts may hold that such actions are to be brought under admiralty juris-
diction. See infra notes 214-289 and accompanying text.
[oi In the unlikely event that the negligence attributed to these ground-based
activities can be traced only to United States acts or omissions occurring in for-
eign countries (e.g., tracking stations) with no traceable link to United States terri-
tory, then such actions will be barred by the foreign country exception. See 28
U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1982). See aLso infra notes 270-330 and accompanying text.
107 See generally Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 104-06 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In
Beattie, the plaintiffs based their FrCA claim on a United States government act or
omission occurring in Antarctica where no substantive law existed. The court
consequently applied choice of law principles outlined in the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971) to determine that the substantive law of the
District of Columbia should apply. See infra notes 270-330 and accompanying
text, which disusses the inapplicability of the foreign country exception to such a
situation.
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torts committed on or above the sovereignless areas of
the high seas and Antarctica, even when the torts oc-
curred solely in these areas. 10 8 In a similar situation in-
volving a tort which occurred solely in outer space, a
court logically should turn to those relevant choice of law
factors set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws.'0 9 In analyzing the substantive constraints in-
volved, it would not be surprising, absent other factors,
for courts to conclude that District of Columbia substan-
tive law should apply. The District of Columbia would be
the most logical choice because it is the capitol of the
United States, the origin of United States space policy and
the headquarters of all outer space related federal
agencies.
Similarly, an inability to obtain proper venue under 28
U.S.C. § 14020 should not defeat the hearing of this
claim. According to section 1402, any action on a tort
claim against the United States arising under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346"' "may be prosecuted only in the judicial district
where the plaintiff resides or wherein the act or omission
complained of occurred."' 1 2 If plaintiffs happen to be
residents of another country and the act or omission com-
plained of occurs solely in outer space, technically venue
might not be proper anywhere. However, congressional
intent and a rule of construction adopted by the Supreme
Court would not allow such a result. In Brunette Machine
Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Industries, Inc.,' the Supreme Court
noted that there had been, and perhaps still were, occa-
sional cases for which the federal courts had jurisdiction,
but for which there existed no district in which venue was
1o See, e.g., Beattie, 756 F.2d at 105-06. In this case, the court of appeals held
that although 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) directs the court to apply the law of the place
where the tort occurred, the fact that Antarctica has no law to apply should not
defeat plaintiffs FTCA claim. Id. at 104-06.
- RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFI.CT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
-, 28 U.S.C. § 1402 (1982).
il 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1982).
112 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b) (1982).
1., 406 U.S. 706 (1972).
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proper.l" 4 The Court concluded that Congress had reme-
died that situation in 1966 by amending the general venue
statute." 15 The Court stated:
The [legislative] development supports the view that Con-
gress does not in general intend to create venue gaps,
which take away with one hand what Congress has given
by way ofjurisdictional grant with the other. Thus, in con-
struing venue statutes it is reasonable to prefer the con-
struction that avoids having such a gap.' 16
In a situation involving torts occurring solely in outer space
in which venue technically would not be proper in any dis-
trict, dismissal of such claims for lack of venue would cre-
ate a gap between jurisdiction and venue. This gap
undoubtedly would create a substantial hardship not usu-
ally found in other dismissals for lack of venue, where an-
other court with jurisdiction over the case, sitting in a
district in which venue is proper, can hear the case.
C. Limited Jurisdictional Parameters
Section 1346(b) of the FTCA sets forth sharply-defined
and strictly-construed jurisdictional parameters'" that
any party or the court sua sponte may raise at any time.'18
Under section 1346(b), the acts or omissions complained
of must be caused by an employee of the United States
government."1 9 Clearly, when the acts or omissions can
be traced to members of the armed forces or any one of a
myriad of government agency employees, this require-
ment will be met. 20 However, government-sponsored
114 Id. at 710 n.8.
Id.
Id. Similarly, the court in Beattie adopted this reasoning with regard to the
determination of proper venue according to 28 U.S.C. § 1402 (1982), for claims
arising in Antarctica brought by residents of foreign countries pursuant to the
FTCA. Beattie, 756 F.2d at 104.
"1 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
",FFD. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
,2( According to 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1982), an employee of the government in-
cludes "officers or employees of any federal agency, members of the military or
naval forces of the United States, . . . and persons acting on behalf of a federal
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outer space activities necessarily involve many private
contractors, subcontractors, and other non-government
personnel. Confusion may arise as to whether a particular
person or juridical entity whose act or omission was the
proximate cause of a space related accident was an "em-
ployee of the government."
It is now widely held, although there is some disagree-
ment, that the issue of federal employment is a question
to be determined by reference to federal law, on the the-
ory that the states may not decide for the United States
who is and who is not an employee of the federal govern-
ment.12' While section 2671 of the FTCA specifically ex-
cludes "contractors" from the definition of a federal
agency of the government and thus excludes them from
the scope of the FTCA, that section does not indicate
when a person or corporation is, in fact, a contractor
rather than an employee. 22 In Logue v. United States,' 23 the
United States Supreme Court held that a person's status
as a contractor or an employee should be determined by
applying the traditional distinction between employees of
a principal and employees of an independent contractor
of the principal. 24 The Court stated that the "critical fac-
tor in making this determination is the authority of the
principal to control the detailed physical performance of
the contractor."' 25  The Supreme Court concluded that
agency in an official capacity temporarily or permanently in the service of the
United States, whether with or without compensation."
121 Pattno v. United States, 311 F.2d 604, 605 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373
U.S. 911 (1963). See also, Annot., 57 A.L.R. 2d 1448 (1958).
122 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1982). Section 2671 states in part: "The term 'Federal
agency' includes the executive departments, the military departments, independ-
ent establishments of the United States, and corporations primarily acting as in-
strumentalities or agencies of the United States, but does not include any
contractor with the United States." Id.
123 412 U.S. 521 (1973).
24 Id. at 526-27.
125 Id. The Supreme Court makes specific reference to the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF AGENCY, which sets forth the distinction:
(1) A master is a principal who employs an agent to perform service
in his affairs and who controls or has the right to control the physical
conduct of the other in the performance of the service.
(2) A servant is an agent employed by a master to perform service in
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the right to make inspections to verify compliance with
federal standards absent authority to physically supervise
the contractor's employees, did not make the United
States the employer; therefore, the United States could
not be sued under the FTCA.
126
Similarly, one also may have to determine whether a
specific person is an employee of the United States gov-
ernment or of the independent contractor. The factor of
primary importance is control over the work of such an
individual.127 If the federal government has such control
or right of control, the person ordinarily will be consid-
ered an employee of the government. The mere fact that
some entity other than the government pays the individ-
ual, or that the government owns the property which the
person uses negligently, is not determinative of the status
of that person. 128
In a suit for damages or injuries arising out of outer
space activities, it may be practically impossible at the out-
set of the impending litigation to determine whether an
alleged tortfeasor was an employee of the government or
whether the tort arose from the actions of a federal
agency. Although these two issues may arise in the same
case, they are susceptible to separate analysis. Since the
claimant will have the burden 29 to prove the alleged
his affairs whose physical conduct in the performance of the service
is controlled or is subject to the right to control by the master.
(3) An independent contractor is a person who contracts with an-
other to do something for him but who is not controlled by the other
nor subject to the other's right to control with respect to his physical
conduct in the performance of the undertaking. He may or may not
be an agent.
Id. at 572 n.5 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1958)).
126 Id. at 531-32.
'2 United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807 (1976). See generally Annot., 57
A.L.R.2D 1448 (1958).
128 See, e.g., Martarano v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 805, 808 (D. Nev. 1964)
(fact that person was compensated as an employee by the state of Nevada did not
disqualify him from status as an employee of the United States government);
Leary v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 953, 956 (D.N.H. 1960) (fact that National
Guard lieutenant was paid with federal funds did not make him a federal
employee).
21) Hopson v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 804, 811-12 (W.D. Ark. 1956).
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tortfeasor is an employee of the government, he should
file suit against certain other defendants in their private
capacities as well, at least to the extent that these defend-
ants are not immune from suit. This will ensure that in
the event of a finding that the United States is not liable
under the FTCA, the claimant will not be barred by appli-
cable statutes of limitations from suing the other
defendants.
Another jurisdictional prerequisite to suit is that the
acts or omissions complained of must have been caused
by an employee of the government "while acting within
the scope of his office or employment."' 3 0 State respondeat
superior law controls the determination of scope-of-em-
ployment questions.' 3' However, this law is unclear in
many instances and varies from state to state. The case of
a serviceman acting in the line of duty is analogous to a
private employee acting within the scope of his employ-
ment under the FTCA. 3 2 These cases also are deter-
mined by applicable state respondeat superior law.133
Problems with regard to scope of employment may
arise in space activities if an employee deviates from in-
structions, or commits an unauthorized act, reckless con-
duct or tort while "off duty," either on the ground or
aboard a spacecraft. Problems also may arise if an em-
ployee of a private corporation is working simultaneously
for a government agency, such as NASA. For example, if
an employee's duties as a payload specialist aboard the
Shuttle include the performance of functions for his pri-
vate employer in addition to certain functions for NASA,
there may be problems in determining whether at the
time of the alleged negligence that person was acting
within the scope of his office or employment with the
'- 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
, Williams v. United States, 350 U.S. 857 (1955).
132The United States Code states: " 'Acting within the scope of his office, or
employment,' in the case of a member of the military or naval forces of the United
States . . . means acting in the line of duty." 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1982).
'" s See, e.g., Berrettoni v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 907 (D. Mont. 1967)(ser-
viceman's leave status was determined under state respondeat superior law).
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United States government.
134
Another jurisdictional prerequisite to maintenance of
an FTCA action is the occurrence of an act or omission
"under circumstances where the United States, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with
the law of the place where the act or omission oc-
curred."'' 35 The test for determining the United States'
liability is whether a private person would be responsible
for similar negligence under the law of the state where the
acts occurred. 3 6 However, many space activities, either
for economic or national security reasons, ordinarily may
not be entered into by private persons. To determine
whether jurisdiction lies under the FTCA in these situa-
tions, the test is whether under applicable state law a pri-
vate person doing what the government was doing could
be sued for negligence. 37 In Bulloch v. United States, 38 a
case involving alleged negligence of the government
when conducting nuclear tests, the court wrote that
[u]nder the Tort Claims Act permitting recovery against
the United States if a private person would be liable, it is
not necessary to show that a private person could be sued
under identical circumstances. . . . It is pointed out that
private persons under existing law cannot legally detonate
a nuclear device. Neither can they maintain armies, oper-
ate the postal service, operate, independent of Govern-
ment, certain secret experimental aircraft, or operate
military airbases. Yet, there are analogous private activi-
ties in the scope of which certain negligent acts would give
rise to private liability. [There is] no doubt that as to
these, there may be corresponding responsibility on the
part of the Government under the Tort Claims Act, de-
,.14 See generally Pattno v. United States, 311 F.2d 604 (10th Cir. 1962) (question
arose as to status of Air National Guard flight instructor as state or federal
employee).
'5 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
1'. See United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 153 (1963); Indian Towing Co. v.
United States, 350 U.S. 61, 68 (1955).
,.1 See Big Head v. United States, 166 F. Supp. 510 (D. Mont. 1958). However,
close attention must be paid to another possible exception to jurisdiction: the
discretionary function exception. See infra notes 158-212 and accompanying text.
13" 133 F. Supp. 885 (D. Utah 1955).
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pending upon the particular facts. . . . [T]o hold the
Government responsible for certain acts or omissions oc-
curring in the course of nuclear tests would not necessar-
ily visit the Government with 'novel or unprecedented
liabilities' contrary to the intent of Congress. 139
Bulloch and subsequent cases support the proposition that
suit against the federal government for a particular outer
space activity is not banned per se simply because such ac-
tivity is carried out only by the government and not by
private enterprise, nor because such a suit would involve a
matter for which the government never has been sued
before.
It also must be noted that in Feres v. United States,' 40 the
Supreme Court judicially created an exception to the
waiver of sovereign immunity accomplished by the FTCA,
holding that Congress had not intended to waive sover-
eign immunity with respect to activity incident to military
service. Thus, servicemen generally are precluded from
suing the United States government for damages, injuries
or death occurring while on duty. In Feres, the plaintiffs
decedent was an Army private killed in a barracks fire
caused by a defective heating plant. 4 ' The United States
Supreme Court ruled that the United States generally is
not liable for any service-connected disability or death of
any member of the United States armed services incurred
in the course of active duty.' 4 2 Subsequently, in Stencel
Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 43 the Court filtered
out three factors it considered controlling in Feres-type
cases: (1) the distinctively federal character of the rela-
tionship between the soldier and the sovereign; (2) the
existence of a no-fault statutory compensation scheme
that serves as a substitute for governmental tort liabil-
139 Id. at 892 (citations omitted).
14o 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
14, Id. at 137.
142 Id. at 146.
.41 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
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ity'4 4; and (3) the concern about possible adverse effects
on the military disciplinary structure if tort litigation were
allowed against the sovereign. 45
Therefore, United States military servicemen probably
could not obtain FTCA recovery from the government for
injuries suffered in a space related accident while on ac-
tive duty. In Charland v. United States, 146 the United States
Supreme Court interpreted "active duty" to encompass
those injuries sustained in the course of an activity inci-
dent to service and subject to military orders and disci-
pline. In Charland, the Court held that a Navy seaman
killed on leave while voluntarily participating in Navy
training exercises was barred from recovery under the
Feres doctrine. 147 The Court reasoned that although the
serviceman was on furlough, he remained on active duty
and was subject to military orders and discipline at all
times while on board the Navy vessel.'4 8
Active duty does not, however, include injuries to ser-
vicemen which are not service-connected or in any sense
incident to military service. In Snyder v. United States, "I an
Air Force sergeant, while off duty and at his privately-
owned home off base, suffered injuries when a govern-
ment bomber which had been abandoned in flight crashed
into his house. The court held that since the injuries were
neither service-connected nor in any sense incident to the
sergeant's military service, the Feres doctrine did not pre-
clude his FTCA action against the United States. 15 1
While there have been a number of conflicting and in-
consistent opinions rendered by the courts in attempts to
identify situations in which servicemen may recover under
144 Id. at 672-730. See, e.g., The Veterans Benefit Act, 38 U.S.C. §§ 301-62
(1982) (provides the upper limit of liability for service-connected injuries).
,4. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 672-73.
14,i 615 F.2d 508, 509 (9th Cir. 1980).
14' Id.
148 Id.
149 118 F. Supp. 585 (D. Md. 1953), modified, 218 F.2d 266 (4th Cir. 1954), affd,
350 U.S. 906 (1955).
'5" Id. at 596-98.
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the FTCA, a few principles can be stated with reasonable
certainty. Servicemen probably will be allowed recovery
for space-related injuries occurring while off duty and off
base. Conversely, servicemen probably will not be al-
lowed to recover for space-related injuries occurring
while on duty and on base. Servicemen injured aboard a
United States space object or space vehicle probably will
be precluded from recovery under the FTCA regardless
of whether they were on duty or off duty.'
5
'
Government civilian employees injured while on duty
also are precluded from maintaining an action under the
FTCA against the United States. The government pro-
vides specific remedies for injured employees under the
Federal Employee Compensation Act (FECA). 152 These
statutes contain exclusive government liability provisions,
and the prohibition against suit extends to relatives or
other parties attempting to claim damages through the in-
jured party. 5 3 Section 8116(c) of the FECA states, "the
liability of the United States or an instrumentality thereof
• with respect to the injury or death of an employee is
exclusive, and in place of all other liability of the United States
or the instrumentality to the employee . . . . The
FECA is the federal equivalent of workmen's compensa-
tion. Where the FECA applies, a federal employee may
not seek recovery of damages from the United States or a
fellow worker.' 55 The FECA only provides relief, how-
ever, when there is personal injury sustained in the per-
formance of the federal worker's duty. If the federal
employee is injured while off duty, the FECA does not ap-
15, But cf. Johnson v. United States, 749 F.2d 1530 (11 th Cir.) (holding that the
Feres doctrine should not bar FTCA recovery by the widow of a Coast Guard heli-
copter pilot killed during a rescue mission, because the civilian status of the gov-
ernment tortfeasors, FAA flight controllers, made it inconceivable that the suit
would adversely affect military discipline), vacated for reh 'g en bane, 760 F.2d 244
(11 th Cir. 1985), reinstated, No. 83-5764 (11 th Cir. Jan. 13, 1986).
152 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-93 (1982).
15. 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c); see also Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 103 S.
Ct. 1033, 1036 (1983).
14 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (1982) (emphasis added).
-'. Gilliam v. United States, 407 F.2d 818, 819 (6th Cir. 1969).
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ply and that employee may seek compensation against the
United States under the FTCA. Therefore, the success of
claims against the United States by federal employees or
their relatives for injuries arising out of outer space activi-
ties depends upon whether the employee was injured in
the performance of his duty.
D. Particular Exceptions
The FTCA also contains twelve specific exceptions to
the government's waiver of sovereign immunity.1 56
Although these exceptions usually are asserted by the
government when answering a claimant's complaint, as a
practical matter these defenses are jurisdictional and can
be raised appropriately at any time during the litiga-
tion. 157 The following discussion examines some of the
more problematic exceptions which might be raised in
suits against the government for outer space related torts.
1. Discretionary Function Exception
By far the most confusing, controversial and litigated
exception is the discretionary function exception which
bars
[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee
of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution
of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or
regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or per-
formance or the failure to exercise or perform a discre-
tionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or
an employee of the Government, whether or not the dis-
cretion involved be abused. 158
u-; 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1982). These exceptions include but are not limited to the
discretionary function exclusion; any claim for which a remedy is provided in ad-
miralty; any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, malicious
prosecution, abuse of powers, libel, slander, deceit or interference with contrac-
tual rights; any claim arising out of combatant activities of the military, naval
forces or Coast Guard during time of war; and any claim arising in a foreign coun-
try. Id.
1.17 Gilman, Problems Relating to Jurisdiction and Forum NAon Conveniens: Fromi the
Standpoint of the United States, 1984 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 150, 155.
-s 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982).
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Nowhere in the FTCA is the term "discretionary func-
tion" defined, and the legislative history159 provides very
little guidance. The leading case construing the parame-
ters of the discretionary function exception is the United
States Supreme Court case of Dalehite v. United States. 160
While Dalehite is the landmark case construing this excep-
tion, it is also the cause of much confusion because of the
Court's unduly broad language and refusal to define pre-
cisely where the discretionary exception ends. Dalehite
arose out of the disaster caused by the eruption of fires
and explosions after the government had loaded ships
with combustible fertilizer. Negligence was alleged in the
adoption of the plan to export the fertilizer, in contracting
for its manufacture, in handling the shipment and in fight-
ing the subsequent fire. The Court held that the case was
barred by the discretionary function exception, finding
that the federal employees involved were following "a
plan developed at a high level under a direct delegation of
plan-making authority from the apex of the Executive
Department." 161
The Court, in discussing the discretionary exception,
stated that it covers "all employees exercising discre-
tion, "162 and that this includes the "discretion of the exec-
utive or the administrator to act according to one's
judgment of the best course."'' 63 The "determination
made by executives or administrators in establishing
plans, specifications or schedules of operations '  and
the acts of subordinates in carrying out these plans are
also covered by this exception. However, the Court
stated that the exception does not include, for example,
the negligent conduct of an employee in an automobile
accident. 165
-9 H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 5 (1945).
-6o 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
-6, Id. at 40.
"' Id. at 33.
" I d. at 34.
'I ld. at 35-36.
I65 ld. at 34.
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While the Supreme Court defined the two extreme pa-
rameters of the discretionary function exception, it re-
fused to delineate an all-important precise middle
boundary where discretion ends and liability begins.
166
The Court simply stated, "[w]here there is room for pol-
icy judgment and decision there is discretion."' 167 Subse-
quent courts and legal scholars have struggled to draw
lines in this grey middle area. The results often have been
inconsistent and unpredictable. However, a majority of
courts seem to have adopted a planning level versus oper-
ational level test in applying this exception to particular
factual situations.' 6  The district court in Swanson v.
United States169 provided guidance for general application
of this test:
Although portions of the Dalehite opinion are no longer
controlling, see Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315,
319, 77 S. Ct. 374, 1 L. Ed. 2d 354 (1957), the planning
level-operations level distinction has been adopted by sev-
eral circuits . ..
In a strict sense, every action of a government em-
ployee, except perhaps a conditioned reflex action, in-
volves the use of some degree of discretion. The planning
level notion refers to decisions involving questions of pol-
icy, that is, the evaluation of factors such as the financial,
political, economic, and social effects of a given plan or
policy. For example, courts have found that a decision to
reactivate an Air Force Base . . .or to change the course
of the Missouri River. . .or to decide whether or where a
post office building should be built in Madison, Wisconsin
.. .are on the planning level because of the necessity to
evaluate policy factors when making those decisions.
The operations level decision, on the other hand, in-
volves decisions relating to the normal day-by-day opera-
tions of the government. Decisions made at this level may
' Id. at 35.
167 Id. at 36.
-" Comment, Discretion and the FAA: An Overview of the Applicability of the Discre-
tionary Function Exception of the FTCA to FAA Activity, 49 J. AIR L. & CoM. 143, 153
(1983).
.. 229 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Cal. 1964).
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involve the exercise of discretion but not the evaluation of
the policy factors. For instance the decision to make low
level plane flights to make a survey . . . or the operation
of an air traffic control tower . . . or whether a handrail
should be installed as a safety measure at the United
States Post Office in Madison, Wisconsin . . .involve the
exercise of discretion but not the evaluation of policy
factors. 170
This planning level versus operational level test is rele-
vant in almost every governmental involvement. When a
planning level decision has been made, there are opera-
tional aspects to then be carried out; there are details to
then be implemented by subordinate personnel. Once a
planning level decision has been made, the government
thereafter may be liable for any negligence in carrying out
the decision. In Pierce v. United States,' 71 an action against
the United States under the FTCA for injuries sustained
by a lineman in an electrical accident at a government or-
dinance works, the court stated:
Once the decision was made to construct substations and
bring in power, all of the discretion required had already
been exercised. Therefore, it became the duty of the gov-
ernment and its agents and employees to exercise due
care in carrying out the program decided upon. The com-
plete failure to do so is outside the protection afforded the
discretionary functions already exercised and results in lia-
bility on the part of the government.' 72
Similarly, it generally is held that the failure to adopt reg-
ulations is a discretionary function, but a failure to carry
out those regulations is not. 7
3
a. As Applied to Indirect Government Activities (Regulation
and Inspection)
It generally has been held that cases involving the issu-
170 Id. at 219-20 (citations omitted).
171 142 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Tenn. 1955).
,72 Id. at 731 (emphasis added).
" Clemente v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 564, 572-76 (D.P.R. 1976).
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ance of licenses, authorizations and permits would fall
under the discretionary function exception and bar suit
against the government absent evidence of an established
standard for the issuance of a particular authorization
which the government employee failed to follow prop-
erly.'7 4 Many courts follow the operational versus plan-
ning level test as an aid in determining whether liability
exists in these types of situations.
It appears that the Department of Transportation's reg-
ulatory activities, as the lead agency for the licensing of
commercial expendable launch vehicles and launching fa-
cilities, would fall under the discretionary function excep-
tion. Suits generally would be barred against the DOT for
negligent licensing certification processes which employ-
ees omit or disregard. However, liability against the DOT
may lie because the negligent act or omission occurred at
the operational level in disregard of a specific DOT regu-
lation or standard. Yet a recent Supreme Court decision
may have broadened the discretionary function exception
even further.
In United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio
Grandense (hereinafter VarigAirlines), 175 the Supreme Court
held that the United States enjoys immunity from liability
for tort claims involving alleged FAA negligence in the is-
suance of aircraft type certificates where the FAA "spot
check" inspection system has been utilized to monitor air-
craft manufacturers' compliance with safety regula-
tions. 1 76 Broadly interpreting the discretionary function
exception for the first time since its decision in Dalehite v.
United States1 77 thirty years earlier, the Supreme Court
stated that discretionary activities of a federal agency "act-
ing in its role as a regulator of the conduct of private indi-
viduals" are immune 'from tort liability under the
114 See generally Annot., 35 A.L.R. FED. 481, 498 (1977).
17.5 104 S. Ct. 2755 (1984).
176 Id. at 2768-69.
177 See supra note 160.
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FTCA. 178
Varig deals with the parameters of liability of the FAA in
failing to discover a safety defect while carrying out its
regulatory duties of inspecting and certifying commercial
aircraft. Varig also is of particular relevance, however, to
the future liability parameters of the DOT in its function
as the lead regulatory agency and general overseer and
coordinator of commercial space launch activities includ-
ing, inter alia, the licensing of private launch vehicles and
launch sites. Problematically, the Vanig decision deals with
narrow facts - the FAA policy decision to utilize a spot
check mechanism of compliance review during the certifi-
cation process of a commercial aircraft. Under the facts of
both Vanig and its companion case, United Scottish Insurance
Co. v. United States,' 79 an area of questionable design was
not examined at all as a result of the government's discre-
tionary policy decision to adopt a spot check method.
Under these facts, the failure to examine an area in ac-
cordance with this policy decision cannot give rise to lia-
bility. However, there is conflict as to whether the Varig
decision will bar actions involving actual inspections, where
an inspection is undertaken negligently.
Not surprisingly, the government takes the position that
Varig stands for the proposition that the FAA's actions in
all certification matters are within the discretionary func-
tion exception.1 8 0 Plaintiffs' lawyers assert that Varig does
not affect the proposition that actions of the government
in actively participating in the inspection process and in
negligently failing to exercise due care in connection with
such inspections will lead to liability. Already conflicts
have arisen in the federal courts in interpreting the pa-
rameters of Varig.
In Proctor v. United States,' 8 the plaintiffs alleged negli-
'7 104 S. Ct. at 2765.
'7,3 104 S. Ct. at 2755.
3 Lloyd's Av. L. Newsletter 2 (Oct. 15, 1984).
19 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,010 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 1984), appeal docketed, No. 83-
6339 (9th Cir. 1984).
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gence by the FAA in the inspection and issuance of a type
certificate for a Saudi Arabian Airlines L- 1011 aircraft se-
verely damaged by fire during a flight in August 1980.
Plaintiffs attempted to distinguish Varig on the ground
that they were alleging negligence by the FAA in con-
ducting an inspection actually performed on the aircraft,
while Varig considered generally the propriety of a "spot-
check" inspection system and involved only an alleged
failure to inspect. 8 2 The district court in Los Angeles re-
jected this argument, stating that, under Varig, the "entire
FAA certification process is immune from potential tort
liability."'' 83 The court said that the discretionary judg-
ment of FAA employees in the course of certification "en-
compasses decisions to thoroughly check, cursorily check,
or not to check at all a particular aircraft or system
.. ""84 Judge Wallace Tashima reasoned that the FAA
logically could not be subject to liability for negligently
performing an inspection when, under Varig, it is immune
from liability for negligently failing to perform an
inspection.
The United States also has been successful in some
courts in obtaining a broad interpretation of Varig in non-
aviation cases. In Hylin v. United States,' 85 which involved
an allegedly negligent inspection by the Mine Enforce-
ment and Safety Administration, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit assumed that the
agency was required to conduct the inspection, but con-
cluded that mine inspectors were required to exercise dis-
cretion in performing those inspections and in taking
enforcement action. The court of appeals thus held in
Hylin that the claims were barred by the discretionary
function exception to the FTCA.
The decisions in Proctor and Hylin demonstrate that the
'82 19 Av. Cas. at 18,011.
183 Id.
,-4 Id. In contrast, the Supreme Court in Varig characterized the plaintiff's
claims as alleging "the negligent failure of the FAA to inspect certain aspects of
aircraft type design in the process of certification ... ".104 S. Ct. at 2766.
1- 755 F.2d 551 (7th Cir. 1985).
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government will attempt to extend Varig and the discre-
tionary function exception in all cases involving allega-
tions of negligence by government employees during
inspection and enforcement activities. The government
certainly will use this precedent to attempt to extend the
discretionary function exception to all DOT and other
federal agency licensing and certification activities of com-
mercial space launch vehicles, payloads and private
launch ranges. However, a recent decision indicates that
the government may not always be successful in this en-
deavor. In McMichael v. United States,' s6 the Eighth Circuit
held that the discretionary function exception did not bar
claims arising from the alleged negligence of the Depart-
ment of Defense in failing to enforce compliance by a con-
tractor with safety requirements set forth in a government
contract. 18 7 The court distinguished Varig on several
grounds, including the ground that the FAA's "spot-
check" inspection system used in the issuance of aircraft
type certificates was intended merely to police compliance
with safety regulations, while the Department of Defense
had assumed responsibility for assuring such compliance
and the Department's quality assurance inspectors were
required to conduct specific inspections not involving any
discretionary judgment. 8 8
Just as it is difficult to reconcile the Supreme Court's
1953 decision in Dalehite18 9 with the many subsequent de-
cisions' 90 rejecting the government's discretionary func-
186 751 F.2d 303 (8th Cir. 1985).
187 Id. at 307.
188 Id. The court emphasized the non-discretionary nature and quality of the
work done by Defense Department employees when compared to FAA employees
in the "spot check" system. The Defense Department had three quality control
inspectors on site at all times at the plant in this case. The inspectors'job descrip-
tions included emphasis on compliance with safety regulation. In addition, the
inspection procedure included a fifty-one step review checklist for safety compli-
ance. Consequently, the court held that the Defense Department inspectors were
not asked to make discretionary regulatory judgments, and therefore the discre-
tionary function exception did not operate to bar the claims. Id.
189 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1952). See supra note 160 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of Dalehile.
1 See, e.g., Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957) (discretionary
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tion defense, it will be difficult to reconcile Varig with
McMichael, Proctor, Hylin and other decisions which are
sure to be handed down in the future. Varig and its prog-
eny undoubtedly will have a substantial effect on any tort
claims arising out of DOT or any other federal agency's
certification, registration, approval or regulation of outer
space activities. As a practical matter, until further
Supreme Court clarification, much will depend upon the
philosophy of the particular court hearing the matter.
b. As Applied to Direct Governmental Activities
While regulatory involvement of the United States in
outer space activities will be subject to the legal parame-
ters set forth under Varig and its progeny, the discretion-
ary function exception also applies to administrative or
policy decisions regarding direct outer space activities un-
dertaken by the United States. Once a specific task is un-
dertaken by the government, however, that task must be
performed with due care, or liability will attach.
In Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 9 ' an action against
the Government for the failure to properly maintain a
lighthouse, the United States Supreme Court held that
the United States was liable for negligently performing a
task it voluntarily undertook in its discretion.'92 The basis
of the holding is that while it may be discretionary on the
part of the government to undertake a task, once the task is
undertaken and relied upon, the government is held to the
same standard of care as private entities in carrying out
the task. 93 The determination of reasonableness in this
function defense defeated FTCA suit claiming negligence of employees of the fire
service in fighting a fire); Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.)
(discretionary function exception held not applicable to air traffic controller who
failed to comply with an FAA regulation resulting in death of twenty-five passen-
gers and crew aboard airliner), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967).
- 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
192 Id. at 69.
193 Id. In applying this rule to the facts of the case, the court stated:
The Coast Guard need not undertake the lighthouse service. But
once it exercised its discretion to operate a light on Chandeleur Is-
land and engendered reliance on the guidance afforded by the light,
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situation is purely a matter of state law.' 9 4 Although In-
dian Towing was decided by the Supreme Court prior to
Varig, Varig did not overturn Indian Towing.
The rule set forth in Indian Towing is known as the
"good Samaritan" rule and has been applied in a number
of situations. For example, once a rescue operation is un-
dertaken, it must be performed with due care.' 9 5 Like-
wise, once the government has decided to place pilings in
a canal, the government must use care to make sure that
the submerged pilings do not damage boats. 96 Similarly,
the United States has consented to suit for the negligence
of its air traffic control employees in the operations phase
of their duties with respect to guiding and controlling air-
craft in the air, landing, taking off and taxiing at
airports. 97
With regard to potential liability of government air traf-
it was obligated to use due care to make certain that the light was
kept in good working order; and, if the light did become extin-
guished, then the Coast Guard was further obligated to use due care
to discover this fact and to repair the light or give warning that it was
not functioning. If the Coast Guard failed in its duty and damage
was thereby caused to petitioners, the United States is liable under
the Tort Claims Act.
Id.
194 Rayonier, 352 U.S. 315 (1957). Here the Court held that the United States
would be liable for losses due to negligence of employees of the Forest Service in
fighting a fire if the law of the state, Washington, would impose liability on private
persons in similar circumstances. Id. at 315. See Reynolds, The Discretionary Func-
tion Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 57 GEO. L.J. 81, 94 n.71 (1968).
Jim United States v. Lawter, 219 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1955) (FTCA action for dam-
ages for death of plaintiffs wife who fell from Coast Guard helicopter while being
rescued).
1I6 Everitt v. United States, 204 F. Supp. 20 (S.D. Tex. 1962) (United States
held liable for damages to shrimp boat resulting from failure of Corps of Engi-
neers to discover and remove piling which had been submerged for over six
months).
197 Spaulding v. United States, 455 F.2d 222, 226 (9th Cir. 1972)(holding that
controller's duty to warn does not completely relieve pilot from primary duty or
responsibility); American Airlines v. United States, 418 F.2d 180, 192 (5th Cir.
1969) (stating in dicta that an air traffic controller, whether or not required to by
manuals, must warn of dangers reasonably apparent to him but not apparent to
the pilot); Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, 373 F.2d 227, 236 (2d Cir.) (holding that
because the FAA voluntarily undertook to transmit weather warnings to pilots, the
FAA had a duty to transmit these warnings non-negligently), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
931 (1967).
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fic control functions, the degree of care required by air
traffic controllers in addition to their specific duties out-
lined in FAA air traffic control regulations and manuals is
"reasonable care." The degree of "reasonable care" here
increases according to the dangers involved in any given
situation, for "It]here is always lurking the possibility of
tragic accidents capable of snuffing out the lives of hun-
dreds in a mere matter of seconds."' 9 8 Stork v. United
States stresses "the need for warning . . . in the face of
extreme danger known to the tower."' 99 In Maryland v.
United States, the court stated, "what constitutes due care
under any circumstances necessarily depends in large part
on the risk and hazard involved. ' 20 0
From this analysis, the FAA can be held liable for negli-
gent acts or omissions in the case of failing to separate
aircraft from or adequately warn aircraft about outer
space activities occurring through FAA controlled air-
space. This analysis also may apply to other government
agencies such as NASA or DOD which supervise, under-
take and operate launch activities in restricted airspace
controlled by those agencies. 20 '
Furthermore, if the United States plays a role in main-
taining safety by the separation of outer space vehicles
from other outer space objects and debris and this role is
relied upon, then the United States may be liable for any
breach of reasonable care in the performance of this oper-
9"8 Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, 373 F.2d 227, 235 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 931 (1967).
- 430 F.2d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 1970).
2- 257 F. Supp. 768, 772 (D.D.C. 1966).
20 As of April 30, 1984, there were seventeen violations of restricted airspace
by light aircraft during Shuttle launches. Kokum, KSC Airspace Violations Raise Con-
cern, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Apr. 30, 1984, at 51. Restricted airspace sur-
rounds the Kennedy Space Center/Cape Canaveral launch areas. Any restricted
areas open during non-launch times are closed three hours before a Space Shuttle
launch. Pilots are restricted by Notice to Airmen (NOTAM's) twenty-four hours
before the areas are closed. Id. If for some reason the procedure for NOTAM's is
not followed or there is a failure to adequately warn aircraft or assure separation
and this failure results in injury or death, it is probable that the United States
government will be liable under the reasoning set forth in Indian Towing. See supra
notes 191-197 and accompanying text.
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ation which proximately causes injuries. 2  In other
words, if the United States performs space traffic control
operations, then the United States also will become the
target of potential lawsuits arising out of any act or omis-
sion which is relied upon and which proximately causes
injuries under the reasoning set forth in Indian Towing.20 3
The United States Air Force, through North American
Defense (NORAD)/Space Command, is responsible for
United States space traffic monitoring activities.20 4
NORAD already performs a collision avoidance role in
the United States Shuttle Orbitor missions. 20 5 NORAD
performs a Computation of Miss Between Orbits
(COMBO) assuring safe separation of the Shuttle from
other objects during launch and orbit. NORAD compares
the flight path of the Shuttle and other space objects and
computes a point of closest approach (PCA). If a risk is
determined, the Shuttle avoids the risk by maneuver-
ing.2 0 6  NORAD/Space Command also performs a
COMBO for private launches such as the Space Services
of America September 1982 launch of its CONESTOGA I
rocket.20 7 While NORAD/Space Command apparently
has no duty to serve as a "space traffic controller," once it
undertakes this duty, any failure to adequately monitor
and warn about inadequate separation or an otherwise
202 United States Air Force (USAF) Colonel Gerald M. May, Director of Space
Operations for Space Command, states, "In order for us to keep everything sepa-
rated in space, we are going to become the traffic cop." Corault, Center Set for
Soviet Space Monitoring, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Mar. 28, 1983, at 57. See also
Corault, Space Defense Organization Advances, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Feb. 8,
1982, at 21. USAF Lieutenant Colonel William Bowers, Space Defense Director
for the Space Defense Operations Center (SDOC), likened the current role of the
SDOC to that of early United States air traffic control. Id.
20. See supra notes 191-197 and accompanying text.
2 4 Corault, Space Defense Organization Advances, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Feb. 8,
1982, at 21.
20- Wirin, The Sky is Falling, PAPER PRESENTED AT THIRTY-FIFTH CONGRESS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL ASTRONAUTICAL FEDERATION COLLOQUIUM, (Lusanne, Switzerland,
Oct. 8-13, 1984).
2W Id.
207 Dula, supra note 50, at 309, 320.
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potentially dangerous situation will result in liability
under the reasoning set forth in Indian Towing.
However, current United States space tracking facilities
are generally military in nature, emphasizing national se-
curity. Consequently, government attorneys may success-
fully shield the United States from liability under the
judicially construed "national security" exception to the
FTCA. Courts have held that the United States govern-
ment has broad discretion in actions which involve na-
tional security. This discretion is illustrated by the
Korean Airlines disaster of September 1, 1983, in which
269 people died when KAL Flight 007 was shot down.20 8
In subsequent litigation, two groups of plaintiffs alleged
that the United States negligently deployed military air-
craft in the vicinity of the flight path of Flight 007 and that
the government should have utilized its capabilities to
warn KAL 007 that it was headed for danger. 20 9  The
United States filed motions to dismiss the plaintiffs' ac-
tions and to enter summary judgment as to all claims
based upon the United States providing air traffic services
and the failure to warn of any impending danger. 210 The
Government asserted that the plaintiffs' allegations were
superceded by national security considerations. 2 1  The
208 In re Korean Airline Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,942
(D.D.C. 1984). During its flight on August 31 through September 1, 1983, Korean
Airlines (KAL) Flight 007 deviated from its assigned international flight, R20,
which it was required to follow after departure from Anchorage, Alaska, while en
route to Seoul, Korea. Id. The failure of Flight 007 to adhere to its assigned flight
path resulted in its passage over the Kamchatka Peninsula, the Sea of Okhotsk,
Sakhalin Island, and the Sea of Japan. Id.
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) controls the airspace over
the Kamchatka Peninsula, the Sea of Okhotsk and Sakhalin Island. Prior to the
September 1, 1983 occurrence, the U.S.S.R. published warnings that aircraft fly-
ing in that airspace may be fired upon without warning. The U.S.S.R. dispatched
jet fighters to intercept KAL Flight 007. Flight 007 was struck by one or more
explosive missiles fired by U.S.S.R. interceptor aircraft, causing Flight 007 to
crash into the Sea of Japan. Id.
209 Id.
2 10 For a review of possible United States government involvement in this acci-
dent, see D. Pearson, KAL 007, What the U.S. Knew and When We Knew It, THE
NATION, Aug. 18, 1984.
211 In re Korean Airlines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,942
(D.D.C. 1984).
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court agreed with the Government:
"[U]nder the doctrine formulated in the landmark deci-
sion, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), plaintiffs may not
present these claims against the government based upon
the decisions of the military concerning the national
security . ..
To the extent that plaintiffs' claims suggest that the gov-
ernment possesses capabilites which it could have utilized
to warn KAL 007 but chose not to utilize, the claims shall
be dismissed. The failure to adopt a policy to utilize avail-
able equipment and procedures for the purposes and in
the manner plaintiffs suggest is a basic policy decision.
Since such alleged negligence is not based upon "imper-
fectly executing a federal program established either by an
act of Congress or a federal regulation" it is not
actionable.21 2
The court's reasoning with regard to national security is
significant. Any suit based on the United States govern-
ment's failure to warn of a dangerous situation in outer
space will undoubtedly come up against similar reasoning.
Justice Department attorneys could defend any case aris-
ing in these circumstances by asserting that for
NORAD/Space Command to warn of an impending dan-
gerous situation in space would involve a policy decision:
not to warn versus violating national security. Courts are
very hesitant to attach liability to any decisions of the
United States government which may involve national
security.
The discretionary function exception together with the
judicially-created national security exception are two po-
tentially broad shields which may effectively preclude re-
covery based upon the United States government's
negligence in the regulation, supervision and monitoring
of outer space activities. Curiously, if private entities were
sued on identical grounds under traditional tort princi-
ples, liability almost certainly would attach.
212 Id. at 17,944.
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2. Suits in Admiralty
Section 2680(d) of the FTCA21 3 provides that the FTCA
does not apply to any claim for which the Suits in Admi-
ralty Act (SIAA)2 14 provides a remedy. The SIAA is a
waiver of sovereign immunity of the United States for
maritime activities resulting in liability against the govern-
ment.21 5 Jurisdiction under the FTCA and SIAA are mu-
tually exclusive.216  SIAA jurisdiction encompasses
admiralty claims arising on navigable waters that bear a
significant relationship to traditional maritime activity. 21 7
Section 745 of the SIAA clearly sets forth a two-year abso-
lute and non-waivable statute of limitations for actions
brought pursuant to the SIAA.2 "18 The SIAA generally ap-
plies to aviation accidents occurring over the high seas. 2 19
It also may apply to outer space related accidents occur-
ring in airspace over the high seas or on the high seas if
they bear a significant relationship to maritime activity. 2 20
In Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland,22  the
Supreme Court clarified the kind of "significant relation-
ship to maritime activity" necessary to invoke SIAA admi-
ralty jurisdiction for aviation torts.222 In Executive Jet, an
aircraft accident occurred immediately after take-off when
the plane flew into a flock of seagulls, ingesting some of
the birds into one of the engines. The aircraft lost power
2- 28 U.S.C. § 2680(d) (1982).
214 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-52 (1982).
I1- d. at §§ 742, 745.
2,, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (1982); Chute v. United States, 449 F. Supp. 172, 175
(D. Mass. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 610 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 936 (1980).
217 Executive jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 268 (1972);
Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520, 523 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070
(1974).
21m 46 U.S.C. § 745 (1982).
2... See Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 268-74.
"" See id. The mere fact that an aviation accident occurs over navigable waters
does not, however, guarantee SIAAjurisdiction; the claim must bear the requisite
relationship to traditional maritime activity. Id.
2' 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
2 Id. at 268-74.
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and fell into Lake Erie.2 23 The Supreme Court decided
that since the aircraft flight was scheduled to be entirely
within the United States, the sinking of the aircraft on
navigable waters was merely fortuitous.22 4 According to
the Court, SIAA jurisdiction should not be predicated
solely on whether the plane happened to be flying over
land or water when the accident occurred. 225 The Court
formulated a "locality plus" test in which both the locality
of the tort and the activity involved are important.2 26
It appears that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Execu-
tive Jet would apply with equal force to space torts occur-
ring over or on navigable waters. However, the scope of
admiralty jurisdiction is not fixed but is restricted or en-
larged as the law develops.227 The question of whether
space torts in general fall within the jurisdiction of admi-
ralty or law is still untested. Logical extension of the
Supreme Court's Executive Jet reasoning regarding the dis-
similarity of most aviation torts to maritime activity, how-
ever, suggests that most space torts also will not be
considered cognizable in admiralty absent a significant re-
lationship to a maritime activity. It should be
remembered that at the beginning of the development of
aviation in the United States, however, there was consid-
erable opinion to the effect that "the entire ocean of air
surrounding the earth" was within admiralty jurisdic-
tion. 228 Therefore, all flights through the air medium
were within admiralty jurisdiction. While this theory
never received general acceptance,229 it is possible that
such reasoning may be urged by advocates who see ad-
22-3 Id. at 250.
224 Id. at 272-73.
2.5 Id. at 267-68.
226 See id. at 251, 265-68.
227 See, e.g., Extension of Admiralty Act, 49 U.S.C. § 740 (1982) (extending ad-
miralty and maritime jurisdiction to injuries caused by vessels); Death on High
Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-67 (1982) (wrongful death actions); Jones Act, 49
U.S.C. § 688 (1982) (injuries to seamen).
22 See Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85, 91 n.23 (D. Cal. 1954);
see generally, 2 AM. JUR. 2D Admiralty § 23 (1962).
2251 Wilson, 121 F. Supp. at 91 n.23.
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vantages in the application of admiralty law to their partic-
ular case. Such a general argument absent specific facts
linking the tort to maritime activities, however, appears
unlikely to succeed in light of the Executive Jet decision.
Similarly, these advocates also may assert that since
Congress recently extended the federal courts special
maritime and territorial criminal jurisdiction to space
flights, 230 admiralty jurisdiction over such flights also
might extend to civil cases. However, this argument
would be spurious in light of the fact that in the past Con-
gress also extended federal maritime criminal jurisdiction
to include crimes committed on board aircraft in flight
over the high seas,2 ' while maritime civil jurisdiction for
torts lies only if the wrongful acts bear a significant rela-
tionship to maritime activity.2 32
Finally, the Supreme Court in Executive Jet effectively
separated aeronautical torts from torts related to "water-
borne vessels. 233 Such reasoning can easily be applied to
space torts as well:
Unlike waterborne vessels, [airplanes] are not restrained
by one-dimensional geographic and physical boundaries.
For this elementary reason, we conclude that the mere fact
that the alleged wrong "occurs" or "is located" on or over
navigable waters - whatever that means in an aviation
context - is not of itself sufficient to turn an airplane neg-
230 18 U.S.C. § 7(6) (1982) provides that the federal courts' special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases includes jurisdiction over:
[A]ny vehicle used or designed for flight or navigation in space and
on the registry of the United States pursuant to the Treaty on Princi-
ples Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies and
the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer
Space, while that vehicle is in flight, which is from the moment when
all external doors are closed on Earth following embarkation until
the moment when one such door is opened on Earth for disembarka-
tion or in the case of a forced landing, until the competent authori-
ties take over the responsibility for the vehicle and for persons and
property aboard.
Id.
".' See 18 U.S.C. § 7(5) (1982).
2-12 See supra notes 222-226 and accompanying text.
2'- 409 U.S. at 265-68.
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ligence case into a "maritime tort". It is far more consis-
tent with the history and purpose of admiralty to require
also that the wrong bear a significant relationship to tradi-
tional maritime activity. We hold that unless such a rela-
tionship exists, claims arising from airplane accidents are
not cognizable in admiralty in the absence of legislation to
the contrary. . . . It is true that in a literal sense there may
be some similarities between the problems posed for a
plane downed on water and those faced by a sinking ship.
But the differences between the two modes of transporta-
tion are far greater, in terms of their basic qualities and
traditions, and consequently in terms of the conceptual
expertise of the law to be applied. . . . For the reasons
stated in this opinion we hold that, in the absence of legis-
lation to the contrary, there is no federal admiralty juris-
diction over aviation tort claims arising from flights by
land-based aircraft between points within the continental
United States.234
It is important to note that the Executive Jet decision was
limited to flights by land based aircraft between points
within the continental United States.23 5 The Supreme
Court in Executive Jet suggested, and subsequent decisions
have held, that admiralty jurisdiction will still lie for avia-
tion accidents on international flights over the high seas,
or other aviation activities which bear a significant rela-
tionship to maritime activity. 236 Domestic flights between
islands or between islands and mainland have been held
to fall under admiralty jurisdiction.23 7
From this analysis, it appears that most accidents in-
volving outer space activities would not lie in admiralty,
but in law. However, certain operations inherent in space
activities may be deemed to have a significant relationship
to maritime activities, such as waterlaunch activities,
splashdown activities, and Coast Guard and Navy safety,
234 409 U.S. at 268-69, 274.
2.5 Id. at 274.
2- 409 U.S. at 274; Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520, 524 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974).
27 See, e.g., Hark v. Antilles Airboats, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 683, 687 (D.V.I. 1973).
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reconnaissance and tracking activities. It is plausible,
therefore, that if an accident occurs during certain phases
of certain outer space related activities, the SIAA, not the
FTCA, will apply in a resulting tort action against the
United States.23 s
When a court's admiralty jurisdiction under the SIAA is
held applicable to an accident arising from United States
outer space activities and the accident results in death to
people on the high seas or in subadjacent airspace, then
the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) 239 may apply to
any subsequent action filed. Congress enacted DOHSA in
1920 because the Supreme Court previously had con-
cluded that general maritime law provided no basis for re-
covery in the case of wrongful death. 240  The DOHSA
provides a remedy for wrongful death "occurring in the
high seas beyond a marine league [three nautical miles]
from the shore of any State, or the District of Columbia,
or the territories or dependencies of the United
States."24 ' Courts have broadly interpreted the term
"high seas" under DOHSA and have construed the term
to include territorial waters of a foreign country.24 2 A
maritime tort committed on navigable waters within a
state, however, will be governed by the wrongful death
statute of that state.243
21 Compare Kelly v. United States, 531 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1976) (Coast Guard
negligence during rescue of drowning victims from capsized sailboat fell within
admiralty jurisdiction even though the negligence in question took place on land,
since the tortious conduct bore a significant relationship to traditional maritime
activity), with Teachey v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1197 (D. Fla. 1973) (negli-
gence following Coast Guard helicopter rescue of victims from sinking boat did
not fall within admiralty jurisdiction since the negligence occurred after the heli-
copter returned to land and refueled); see generally Annot., 30 A.L.R. FED. 759
(1976) (discussing what constitutes a significant relationship to traditional mari-
time activity to support federal admiralty jurisdiction in aviation tort cases).
2.41, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-67 (1982).
240 The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 213 (1886), overruled, Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 409 (1970).
24 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1982).
242 See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near Bombay, India, 531 F. Supp. 1175,
1182-84 (W.D. Wash. 1982), and the sources cited therein.
24., Annot., 71 A.L.R. 2D 1296, 1302-03 (1960).
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a. Damages Recoverable Under DOHSA
DOHSA provides a right of action under United States
admiralty law and under the law of any foreign country if
such a right is granted under the applicable foreign law.244
Although foreign substantive law can be applied, United
States procedural law is still followed. However, the rem-
edies granted under the DOHSA choice of law provisions
are not cumulative.245 Instead, the federal court hearing
the case must decide whether to apply American law or
foreign law in a given situation, applying relevant choice
of law principles to the particular facts and circumstances
presented.246 Courts considering relevant choice of law
principles applicable to the DOHSA have concluded that
the choice of law principles governing claims brought
under the Jones Act, 24 7 as set forth in Lauritzen v. Larsen,248
govern DOHSA choice of law questions as well. 249 The
Supreme Court in Lauritzen enumerated seven points of
contact to be considered in choosing applicable law: (1)
the place of the wrongful act; (2) the law of the flag; (3)
the allegiance or domicile of the injured; (4) the alle-
giance of the shipowner; (5) the place of contract; (6) the
inaccessibility of a foreign forum; and (7) the law of the
forum.25 ° In Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis,25 ' the Supreme
Court added an eighth factor: the shipowner's base of op-
erations.2 52 Such factors apply to aircraft accidents and
can be applied easily to space accidents occurring on the
high seas.
244 46 U.S.C. §§ 761, 764 (1982).
24-1 In re Air Crash Disaster Near Bombay, India, 531 F. Supp. at 1185.
2" See id. at 1185-90.
4 7 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982).
248 345 U.S. 571, 583-92 (1953).
249 See DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F.2d 895, 900 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 904 (1978); Fitzgerald v. Texaco, Inc., 521 F.2d 448, 454 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1052 (1976); Symonette Shipyards, Ltd. v. Clark, 365 F.2d
464, 467 (5th Cir. 1966); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Bombay, India, 531 F.
Supp. 1175, 1185 (W.D. Wash. 1982); Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 202 F. Supp.
556, 557-58 (D. Del. 1962).
2 5o Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 583-92 (1953).
2- 398 U.S. 306 (1970).
52 Id. at 309.
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If the DOHSA is applicable, then specific damage law
applies. DOHSA sets forth its own remedy and applicable
substantive law. DOHSA section 762 provides that recov-
ery in a suit brought under the Act "shall be a fair and just
compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained by the per-
sons for whose benefit the suit is brought. ' 253 In deter-
mining the amount of pecuniary loss to the beneficiaries,
the chief element to be taken into consideration is the loss
of the decedent's actual financial assistance or contribu-
tions to the beneficiaries.2 54 Generally, awards of pecuni-
ary loss represent two periods of pecuniary loss: losses
from the time of the decedent's wrongful death up to the
date ofjudgment, and future losses occurring subsequent
to the date of judgment. With regard to future losses,
DOHSA requires that the court discount the award
amount to its present value.255
In determining the amount of pecuniary loss, courts
have taken into consideration the decedent's health, 56 life
expectancy 257 and work expectancy. 258 Past earnings and
probable future earnings also play a very significant role
in determining the amount of pencuniary loss to the bene-
ficiaries. The decedent's projected personal living ex-
penses, such as food, mortgage payments, basic utilities
and the decedent's "pocket money," also must be fac-
tored into the DOHSA damages determination.259
Pre-judgment interest may be allowed in DOHSA ac-
tions at the discretion of the trial court.2 60 Pre-judgment
interest from the date of death has been held allowable
25. 46 U.S.C. § 762 (1982).
24 16 A.L.R. FED. 679, 684-85 (1975).
"-'. See Dugas v. National Aircraft Corp., 438 F.2d 1386, 1388-89 (3d Cir. 1971);
The S.S. Black Gull, 90 F.2d 619, 620 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 728 (1937); In
re Risdal & Anderson, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 353, 359 (D. Mass. 1968).
251; See First Nat'l Bank v. National Airlines, Inc., 288 F.2d 621, 623 (2d Cir.
1958).
25 See Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 342 F.2d 232, 238-40 (3d Cir. 1965).
2" See In re Canal Barge Co., 323 F. Supp. 805, 820 (D. Miss. 1971).
21 See Chermesino v. Vessel Judith Lee Rose, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 36, 39 (D.
Mass. 1962), af'd, 317 F.2d 927, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 931 (1963).
2"' Soloman v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1976).
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under DOHSA.261' In a recent case brought under
DOHSA, the court awarded pre-judgment interest at a
rate of eight percent.262 DOHSA does not allow recovery
for the decedent's conscious pain and suffering, 263 or for
the beneficiaries' loss of love and affection 264 or grief
caused by the wrongful death of the decedent, 65 or for
funeral or burial expenses. 66
3. The Foreign Country Exception
Another possible defense which the Justice Department
may raise in an otherwise actionable FTCA claim against
the United States for torts resulting from outer space ac-
tivities is the "foreign country" exception. Section
2680(k) of the FTCA exempts from coverage under the
FTCA "any claim arising in a foreign country. ' 267 Legis-
lative history and case law indicate that this exception
seeks to prevent the United States government from be-
ing subjected to liability dependent upon the law of a for-
eign power. 268 This issue has not yet been resolved. 269 In
view of the underlying rationale for this exception, how-
ever, it appears that outer space will not be construed as a
"foreign country" under section 2680(k) since outer
space, per se, is not subject to the laws of a foreign power
and is indeed "sovereignless. ' ' 270 Such extensions of sov-
263 E.g., Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 342 F.2d 232, 240 (3d Cir. 1965); Na-
tional Airlines v. Stiles, 268 F.2d 400, 406 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885
(1959).
262 Stoddard v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 314, 331 (C.D. Cal.
1980).
263 Brown v. Anderson-Nichols & Co., 203 F. Supp. 489, 490 (D. Mass. 1969);
Canillas v. Joseph H. Carter, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 48, 51 (D.N.Y. 1968).
2- Thompson v. Offshore Co., 440 F. Supp. 752, 764 (S.D. Tex. 1977); In re
Canal Barge Co., 323 F. Supp. 805, 821 (N.D. Miss. 1971).
265 First Nat'l Bank v. National Airlines, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 528, 537 (S.D.N.Y.
1958), afd, 288 F.2d 621 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 859 (1961).
26, Id. at 538.
267 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1982).
26M See infra notes 272-322 and accompanying text.
269 Id.
270 OST, supra note 24. This Treaty clearly states: "Outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim
of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means." Id.
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ereign immunity, though, to judicially untested areas not
specifically included in the waiver of immunity or contem-
plated at the time of drafting, should not be made
lightly. 27' Consequently, an in-depth analysis of the rele-
vant legislative history and case law is warranted. The fol-
lowing analysis will reveal that the foreign country
exception will not be a valid defense for the United States
against FTCA claims arising out of government activities
in outer space, even when resulting injuries occur in a for-
eign country, provided that the negligent act or omission
occurred elsewhere. Analogous case law dealing with the
applicability of the foreign country exception to the high
seas and Antarctica supports this conclusion.
a. Legislative History
In the years preceding adoption of the FTCA in 1946,
many different alternatives were proposed to structure the
precise language contained in Section 2680(k). In 1940,
language was proposed which would have defined the geo-
graphical jurisdiction of the FTCA by a positive inclusion:
"This act shall be applicable only to damages or injury
occurring within the geographical limits of the United
States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Canal
Zone. ' 27 2 It is significant that this language or compara-
ble language such as "the applicability of the FTCA is lim-
ited to claims arising in the United States or its
territories," which limited the applicability of the FTCA to
2' Any waiver of sovereign immunity must be construed strictly by courts.
Thomas v. Calavar Corp., 679 F.2d 416,418 (5th Cir. 1982); See Builders Corp. of
Am. v. United States, 320 F.2d 425, 426 (9th Cir. 1963). The United States
Supreme Court has indicated repeatedly that suit may not be maintained against
the United States in any case not clearly within the terms of the statute by which it
consents to be sued. E.g., United States v. Michel, 282 U.S. 656, 659 (1930); East-
ern Transp. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 675, 686 (1926). Additionally, it seems
reasonable to conclude that government liability for outer space activities was not
contemplated either at the time Congress enacted the FTCA in 1946, or during
the 28 years of congressional drafting preceding enactment.
212 Hearings on S. 2690 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciar,, 76th
Cong., 3d. Sess. 38 (1940).
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a specific geographic area,273 was never accepted. Congress
instead simply made an exception in the case of "foreign
countries. ' 274 Since Congress apparently did not intend
FTCA application to be limited to specific geographic ar-
eas or regions, an extension to activities in outer space
would not, per se, be prohibited.
b. Case Law Interpreting the Intent of Section 2680(k)
Case law interpreting Section 2680(k) reveals the actual
parameters of the exception. The courts have interpreted
the foreign country exception to apply to torts arising
solely in territory where permanent sovereignty ultimately
lies with another nation. Underlying this "sovereignty
test," however, is a determination by the courts on
whether foreign law governs the tort in question. If
United States law is applicable, then the "foreign coun-
try" exception is abrogated by the courts regardless of the
fact that the actual injury occurred in a foreign country.275
United States v. Spelar,276 a 1949 United States Supreme
Court case, is the only decision by that Court addressing
the term "foreign country." Spelar concluded that the
term denoted territory subject to the sovereignty of an-
other nation.277 Spelar involved a suit for wrongful death
arising out of the death of a flight engineer at a United
States air base in Newfoundland, leased for ninety-nine
years by the United States from Great Britain pursuant to
executive agreement. 27" The Supreme Court determined
that even though the accident occurred on a United States
air base, the negligent acts nevertheless arose in a foreign
country.279 The Supreme Court noted that the law which
would have governed the case if the FTCA applied would
273 See Tort Claims Against the United States: Hearings on H.R. 7236 Before Subcomm.
No. 1 of the HouseJudiciary Comm., 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 3 (1940).
24 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1982).
27-1 See infra notes 276-330 and accompanying text.
27,6 338 U.S. 217 (1949).
277 Id. at 219.
279 Id. at 218.
279 Id. at 219-21.
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have been the wrongful death law of Newfoundland.2 80
The Court stated that the FTCA was geared to the sover-
eignty of the United States, and that the executive agree-
ment between the United States and Great Britain for the
leasing of the military bases did not effect a transfer of
sovereignty over the leased areas from Great Britain to
the United States. 281' Analyzing the legislative history be-
hind Section 2680(k), the Supreme Court concluded that
Congress enacted this section to ensure that United States
tort liability does not depend upon the law of a foreign
power.28 2
Subsequent lower court decisions examining this ex-
ception assert that even a temporary transfer of sover-
eignty over property to the United States is not sufficient
to abrogate "foreign country" status.28 3 In Burna v. United
States,284 the court found that after World War II, Okinawa
was a foreign country for FTCA purposes despite the fact
that the United States, pursuant to a treaty with Japan,
had the right to exercise any and all powers of administra-
tion, legislation and jurisdiction.28 5  Finding that the
treaty was simply a transitional arrangement, the court de-
termined that the ability of the United States to exercise
sovereignty was not "a conclusive factor. ' 28 6 Cobb v.
United States287 is a similar case which, like Burna, arose out
of a vehicle accident on the Island of Okinawa. 288 A close
280 Id. at 218.
281 Id. at 221-22.
282 Id. The Court stated:
In brief, though Congress was ready to lay aside a great portion of
the sovereign's ancient and unquestioned immunity from suit, it was
unwilling to subject the United States to liabilities depending upon
the laws of a foreign power. The legislation must be respected. The
present suit, premised entirely upon Newfoundland's law, may not
be asserted against the United States in contravention of that will.ld.
28 Pedersen v. United States, 191 F. Supp. 95, 100 (D. Guam 1961); Brunell v.
United States, 77 F. Supp. 68, 71-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
284 240 F.2d 720 (4th Cir. 1957).
2H.1 Id. at 721.
281 Id. at 722.
287 191 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1951).
289 Id. at 605.
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reading of these two cases indicates that the key to the
decisions is the application of foreign law, not just sovereignty.
Under the FTCA, liability must be determined under
the law of the jurisdiction in which the tort occurs.289
During the United States occupation of Okinawa after
World War II, the United States had complete control
over Okinawa. 9 ° While the United States had the power
to annul all the existing tort law of Okinawa, it does not
appear that it did so.29" ' The United States did not take
this step because such a change would have been in disre-
gard of the legitimate interests of the inhabitants, and
would have violated the "dictates of public conscience" as
well as "the spirit, if not the letter, of Art. 431292 of the
Hague Convention of 1907.293 Therefore, in both Burna
and Cobb, even though the United States for all practical
purposes had complete but temporary sovereignty over
this territory, the application of the FTCA would depend
upon Japanese law. This appears to be the real reason for
invoking the "foreign country" exception in these cases.
In fact, the courts consistently have held that torts occur-
ring solely within American installations on foreign soil
are barred by the foreign country exception, even when
practically all vestiges of sovereignty are transferred to
the United States.294 It is significant that embassies and
military bases in foreign countries often operate under
agreement to apply the foreign country's laws to claims
arising there. In this sense, the sovereignty test does not
necessarily relate to the territory involved, but to the tort
2$9 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
290 Cobb, 191 F.2d at 606.
2111 Id. at 609-10.
"" Id. at 611.
2 13 This article dictates that an occupying power should undertake, as far as
possible, not to disturb the laws in force in the occupied country. See generally
Schwenk, Legislative Power of the Military Occupant Under Article 43, Hague Regulations,
54 YALE L.J. 393, 393-408 (1945).
2114 Meredith v. United States, 330 F.2d 9 (9th Cir.) (United States Embassy in
Thailand), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 867 (1964); Byrson v. United States, 463 F. Supp.
908, 911 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (United States military base in Germany); Welch v.
United States, 446 F. Supp. 75, 76 (D. Conn. 1978) (in dicta) (United States mili-
tary base in Italy).
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itself. And while the courts couch their language in terms
of sovereignty, the "sovereignty test" created by the
courts ultimately is based upon whether foreign laws are
applicable to torts occurring outside United States
territory.
This conclusion is supported further by a line of cases
holding the foreign country exception inapplicable even
though the injuries or the accident occurred in a foreign
country.295 These cases interpret the "arising in" lan-
guage 296 of the FTCA as directing courts to look to the
place where the act or omission took place in determining
the applicable law, not where the actual injury or accident
occurred.297 These decisions hold the foreign country ex-
ception inapplicable even though the accident or injury occurred
in a foreign country.298 Again, the key to these decisions ap-
pears to be a determination of whether United States law
or foreign law governs the resolution of the case. 299 This
body of cases illustrates that an FTCA claim may arise in
the United States, because the negligent act or omission
occurred in the United States, even though the act or omis-
sion had its "operative effect" in a foreign country that is,
the injury actually occurred in a foreign country. 0 0
This conclusion finds further support in aviation cases
occurring in a foreign country. In In re Paris Air Crash of
March 3, 1974,3 °' the court held that if the negligent acts
at issue occurred in the United States, but the operative
effect - in this case an airplane crash - occurred in a
foreign country, the foreign country exclusion does not
apply. 0 2 This case arose out of the crash of a Turkish Air
Lines DC-10 aircraft in France that claimed the lives of
2,- See infra notes 299-300 for a list of some of these cases.
296 FTCA prohibits "any claim arising in a foreign country." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)
(1982) (emphasis added).
27 See infra notes 299-300 for examples of such cases.
29 See infra notes 299-300 for examples of such cases.
2- See, e.g., Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 755, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
mlo Leaf v. United States, 588 F.2d 733, 735-36 (9th Cir. 1978); In re Paris Air
Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732, 737 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
-1 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
30,2 Id. at 737-38.
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346 people. ° The claims against the United States were
based upon the allegedly negligent certification or inspec-
tion of the aircraft by the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion.0 4 Plaintiffs asserted that these acts of negligence
occurred in California. 5 In ruling against the United
States on this issue, the district court stated:
Under the FTCA, a tort claim arises at the place where the
negligent act or omission occurred and not where the neg-
ligence had its "operative effect". . . . Thus, none of the
claims against the United States for death, as alleged in
the complaints, is a "claim arising in a foreign country. "306
These "operative effect" cases relate not so much to the
definition of "foreign country," but to the meaning of
''arising in." They demonstrate that "arising in" does not
necessarily refer to the situs of the injury, but that it may
refer to the situs of the negligence.
Proper pleading is necessary in order for this exception
to the exception to take effect and survive summary judg-
ment motions by the government. In Pignataro v. United
States, 0 7 the plaintiff, a minor, was a passenger on a flight
from Saudi Arabia to Eritrea aboard an unpressurized air-
plane owned by the United States and operated by the Air
Force. 8 The plaintiff sustained permanent loss of hear-
ing and speech when the aircraft allegedly was flown neg-
ligently at an altitude far in excess of the reasonably safe
limits for unpressurized aircraft.3 0 9 The court in Pignataro
dismissed the claim under the FTCA on the ground that it
failed to set forth the local law upon which the claim was
grounded and that if such law was the law of a foreign
country, the claim was barred by section 2680(k).3 1 0 The
court stated that the test for determining whether a claim
". Id. at 735.
4 Id. at 737.
3O5 Id.
30- Id.
3,,7 172 F. Supp. 151 (E.D.N.Y. 1959).
308 Id. at 152.
I(0 d.
I0 ld. at 152-53.
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was excluded by section 2680(k) was whether the place in
which the claim arose was territory subject to the sover-
eignty of another nation and whether the liability asserted
was one depending upon the laws of a foreign power.'
The court noted that the complaint did not state where
the alleged negligent act occurred and that every nation
had the authority to exercise sovereignty over acts occur-
ring in its own territorial airspace 12 The court con-
cluded that if the Government's alleged tortious act
occurred over some foreign country, the claim was one
"arising in a foreign country" and was barred by section
2680(k). 13 The court might have reached a different re-
sult if the allegations contained in the pleadings had been
drafted differently to allege that this crash was due to im-
proper training of the crew or failure to adequately warn
the crew of the dangers of flying this aircraft above certain
altitudes, and that the acts or omissions which proxi-
mately caused this injury took place in the United States. Such
careful pleading might have enabled the plaintiff in
Pignataro to survive the Government's motion for sum-
mary judgment.
From the foregoing analysis, it is clear that determina-
tion of whether the foreign country exception applies re-
volves around substantive jurisdiction over the cause of
action: is the cause of action subject to United States law
or the law of another country? Since liability is to be de-
termined pursuant to the law where the tort arises, an ac-
tion arising solely in a foreign country is barred under the
foreign country exception. Consequently, should injury
or damage caused by United States government person-
nel arise solely in foreign territory or on a non-United
States registered space object that is subject to foreign
law, then it is possible that this exception will be applica-
ble to bar suit under the FTCA. Suit still may be possible,
however, in the unlikely event of underlying negligence
ml, Id. at 152.
312 Id.
.11.' Id.
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by the United States occurring outside of the foreign
country or foreign space object. Additionally, this reason-
ing supports the general proposition that the foreign
country exception will not be a valid defense for the
United States when suit is brought pursuant to the FTCA
for liability arising out of government activities 'in outer
space, even when injuries result in a foreign country.
Outer space, the moon and other celestial bodies have
been declared "sovereignless. ' ' 14 Section 1346 of the
FTCA directs courts to apply the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred. It may be argued by gov-
ernment attorneys that, if the act or omission giving rise
to the tort occurred in outer space, section 1346 would
leave a court in the curious position of having no body of
civil law to apply. This would be directly opposite to the
foreign country exception. At least for the inmediate fu-
ture, however, the interpretation of "arises in" as refer-
ring to where the act or omission took place means that
United States law will apply to a great majority of the situ-
ations involving alleged negligence of the United States
government. This is true because, at the level of space
development which exists today, practically all outer
space activities can be attributed in some way to ground-
based causes. As one observer notes:
Any number of ground-based causes can be conceivable
ranging from faulty surface control and telemetry, im-
proper construction or maintenance of space transporta-
tion systems, negligent design of space stations and
facilities, and so on. In point of fact, it may be argued that
almost every operation in outer space is traceable to or
linked with ground-based functions. 15
Furthermore, with regard to United States registered
space objects or personnel thereof, Article VIII of the
Outer Space Treaty provides that the United States shall
"retain jurisdiction over such space objects, and over any
personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial
.4 OST, supra note 24.
-1 Nesgos, supra note 104.
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body." 6 Thus an accident/injury occurring on a space
object registered to the United States would automatically
be under the jurisdiction of the United States, which
would logically mean that United States law would apply.
Determination of which United States jurisdiction's sub-
stantive law applies would involve a traditional choice of
laws analysis by the forum court.
Furthermore, "sovereignless" areas, areas in which
claims of sovereignty are not recognized by international
agreement, are not "foreign countries" under section
2680(k) and United States law has been held applicable to torts
arising in such areas.317 Cases arising on the high seas or in
international airspace above the seas illustrate this point.
In Blumenthal v. United States,3 18 an action was brought in
admiralty under the Death on the High Seas Act, 319 alleg-
ing negligence on behalf of the United States for wrongful
death of the decedent who died after bailing out of a dis-
abled military plane over international waters between
Korea and Japan.y
The court held that an action for death resulting from
an aircraft accident over international waters was a mari-
time tort under DOHSA and not a tort arising in a foreign
country, and that United States law was applicable.3 2' In this
case, the United States did not have sovereignty over the
territory, but sovereignty over the tort itself. Thousands
of torts arise in sovereignless territories and application
of United States law over these cases is common. There is
no reason why United States law could not apply under
similar circumstances to torts arising in outer space, an-
other sovereignless territory.
The only outer space related situations where FTCA
3 OST, supra note 24, at Article VIII.
.1, See infra notes 318-321 for cases supporting this proposition.
3'" 189 F. Supp. 439 (E.D. Pa. 1960), afld, 306 F.2d 16 (3rd Cir. 1962).
,, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-67 (1982). The Death on the High Seas Act has been held
to apply to aircraft as well as ships. D'Aleman v. Pan Am. World Airways, 259 F.2d
493, 495 (2d Cir. 1958).
.120 189 F. Supp. at 442.
3' Id. at 445-46.
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claims should be barred pursuant to the foreign country
exception are cases in which the negligence arises solely
aboard a space object subject to a foreign law, such as a
foreign-registered space object.322 Of course, if space col-
onies are formed with sufficient attenuation from Earth to
be autonomous and have independent laws, torts arising
in such colonies also may be barred by the foreign country
exception.
c. The Antarctica Analogy
The most persuasive authority for the proposition that
torts occurring in outer space will not be barred by the
foreign country exception is the recent court of appeals
decision of Beattie v. United States.323 Beattie involved an
FTCA action alleging that negligent United States Navy
personnel on duty at air traffic control facilities in Antarc-
tica caused the crash of an Air New Zealand DC-10 on that
continent.3 24 The Government moved to dismiss, assert-
ing that the plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action
upon which relief could be granted because the tort oc-
curred in Antarctica and, thus, the foreign country excep-
tion applied. 25 In denying the Government's motion to
dismiss and affirming the district court, the court of ap-
peals addressed the novel issue of whether Antarctica
constitutes a foreign country under section 2680(k). The
court held that an action arising in Antarctica is not barred
by the foreign country exception. 26
This decision is indicative of the interpretation to be
given the foreign country exception to torts occurring in
outer space. This interpretation results from the unique
similarities in the legal status between Antarctica and
2.2 Under Articles VII & VIII of the Outer Space Treaty, State parties have
agreed to retain jurisdiction over their space objects. It is probable that foreign
law thus will be applicable to torts occurring aboard such foreign registered ob-
jects. OST, supra note 24, at Articles VII-VIII.
32, 756 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
.124 Id. at 92-93.
3 Id. at 93.
.124) Id. at 93-94.
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outer space which have permitted 327 and will permit
courts and legal scholars to analogize between the two
regions.
The Beattie court, in dicta, appears to take for granted
the proposition that a tort occurring in outer space would
not be barred by the foreign country exception. 28 In fact,
the court uses this proposition by analogy to support its
conclusion that the foreign country exception should not
apply to AntarcticaY.9 The court states:
The legal status of Antarctica has been most frequently
analogized to outer space. United States spokesmen sug-
gested the 1959 Antarctic Treaty as a possible model for
an outer space treaty during initial formulation discus-
sions in 1965 and 1966. Obviously, the provisions of a
treaty relating to outer space are only relevant to the pres-
ent case by analogy. However, they are instructive as to
the way in which the United States has acted with refer-
ence to sovereign immunity and liability for acts of its
agents in a context very similar to Antarctica.
The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Includ-
ing the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies [the Space
Treaty], was signed at Washington, London, and Moscow
on 27 January 1967, and entered into force on 10 October
1967. By the terms of the treaty the United States has agreed to be
internationally liable for its space objects and retain jurisdiction
over its own objects and persons. . . . The Space Treaty is ob-
viously not couched in terms of tort claims. However, the
basic principle is that in the sovereigniess reaches of outer space,
each state party to the treaty will retain jurisdiction over its own
objects and persons. Like the decisions. . . holding that Antarctica
is not a 'foreign country "for various purposes, the treatment of
outer space is persuasive by analogy. 
3 30
327 See I. CSABAFI, THE CONCEPT OF STATE JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE
LAW 66 (1971); McDougal, Lasswell, Vlasic & Smith, The Enjoyment and Acquisition
of Resources in Outer Space, Ill U. PA. L. REV. 521, 589 (1963); Lisstzyn, The Ameri-
can Position on Outer Space and Antarctica, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 126, 126-31 (1959).
-428 See Beattie, 756 F.2d at 99-100.
321) Id.
I'll Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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The foregoing analysis indicates that the foreign country
exception should not bar otherwise actionable claims
against the United States pursuant to the FTCA or SIAA
and DOHSA for torts resulting from activities in outer
space, the high seas or United States territory, even if in-
jury or damage occurs in a foreign country.
IV. LIABILITY UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
- PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS
Suits against the United States for negligence under the
FTCA may be brought in the federal "judicial district
where the plaintiff resides or wherein the act or omission
complained of occurred."' 33' The United States of
America is the only proper party to be sued under the
FTCA, not specific agencies or departments.33 2 The
FTCA requires, however, that a claim first be presented to
the "appropriate Federal agency" before suit can be prop-
erly instituted in federal district court.333 Suit can be in-
stituted only after the administrative claim has been
rejected in writing and sent by certified or registered
mail.334 While it is foreseeable that one may not be able
to determine the "appropriate Federal agency," failure to
do so appears to place the burden on the receiving agency
to transfer the claim to the appropriate agency. 3 5 If more
than one federal agency is involved though, it is advisable
to file notice with that agency also. If the agency fails to
dispose of the claim within six months after filing, the
claimant may at any time thereafter consider the claim de-
nied and bring an FTCA claim against the United States
in federal district court.336 If the agency formally denies
the claim in writing within the six month period, however,
the claimant must file suit in federal district court within
ss, 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b) (1982).
5.12 8 U.S.C. § 2679(a) (1982).
.,3 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1982).
Id.
28 C.F.R. § 14.2 (1985).
-" Kennelly, Claims and Suits for Aviation Accidents Under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
1972 TRIAL LAw. GUIDE 1, 36 [hereinafter cited as Kennelly].
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six months after such written denial. 7 While these no-
tice provisions were intended to streamline litigation
against the government, "the opposite has occurred. 3 3 8
With respect to preparation and service of the prerequi-
site notice, one commentator suggests that claimant's
counsel obtain the standard government form provided
for filing the claim.3 39 This form ("Standard Form 95")
can be obtained from any United States Post Office,
United States Attorney, general counsel of most govern-
ment agencies, or by writing directly to the federal agency
whose agent committed the tort.340 Use of Standard Form
95 is not mandatory, but any notice must contain the in-
formation required.3 1  The claim should identify the inci-
dent and all parties, and state the damages claimed in sum
certain. 2 Failure to completely identify the incident al-
33 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1982).
338 Chapman, Preface to Tompkins, Litigation of an Airplane Hull Suit Against the
United States of America, 1983 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 329, 338. Professor Chapman
states:
The "new" provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act, which require
Notices of Claims before filing suit, were designed to diminish the
burden cast upon federal judges in regard to valid tort claims against
the federal government. Congress wanted to supply the federal gov-
ernment with a method of ascertaining the merits of claims before liti-
gation ensued, in order to give the government an opportunity to
review and pay legitimate claims. The opposite has occurred. The
federal government routinely denies all substantial claims against it,
especially where it is the sole defendant. This has resulted in an
unnecessary bureaucracy (in regard to presuit claims under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act) and the unwarranted mandatory prevention of
the filing of legitimate suits for at least six months. It is difficult to
understand why plaintiffs who have valid claims must wait at least six
months simply to permit the bureaucratic processes of the federal
government to file a lot of papers since it is well recognized that: (1)
the government almost never even responds to a Notice of Claim
within six months, and (2) if the federal government finally does re-
spond, it universally sends a routine form letter, which always uses
identical words in denying the claims, however meritorious they
might be.
Id.
.14." Kennelly, supra note 336, at 36.
.440 Id.
34, For a complete list of the specific requirements, see 28 C.F.R. §§ 14.1 -. 11
(1985).
-2 See id.
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most certainly will result in return of the claim for more
specifics. Failure to demand specific damages is an even
more serious defect.3
43
No limit exists as to the amount of the administrative
claim. However, a claimant may not subsequently file a
claim in federal court in excess of the amount presented
to the federal agency, "except where the increased
amount is based upon newly discovered evidence not rea-
sonably discoverable at the time of presenting the claim to
the federal agency or upon allegation and proof of inter-
vening facts, relating to the amount of the claim. '3 44 Any
written reduction of the claim will be construed as an
amended administrative claim, which will later reduce any
maximum recoverable amounts at trial.
3 45
It is important to note that most federal courts have
held that the notice of claim requirement is jurisdictional
and cannot be waived. 46 It also should be noted that this
administrative notice filing tolls the applicable two-year
statute of limitations, not the filing of suit in federal dis-
trict court.3 47 FTCA section 2401(b) provides in relevant
part: "A tort claim against the United States shall be for-
ever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appro-
priate Federal agency within two years after such claim
accrues .. "348 In United States v. Kubick, 49 the United
States Supreme Court held that a claim occurs when the
claimant learns the existence and cause of the injury, and
not when he subsequently learns that there may have
been negligence involved.3 50 This statute of limitations
343 Note, Federal Tort Claims Act: Notice of Claim Requirement, 67 MINN. L. REV. 513
(1982).
344 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b) (1982).
_45 Singer v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 131, 132 (E.D. N.Y. 1960); Carlson v.
United States, 88 F. Supp. 337, 338-39 (N.D. Ill. 1949).
34, Hubbard v. United States Parole Comm'n, 585 F.2d 857, 859 (7th Cir.
1978); Blain v. United States, 552 F.2d 289, 291 (9th Cir. 1977); Allen v. United
States, 517 F.2d 1328, 1329 (6th Cir. 1975).
.147 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1982).
348 Id.
.1C, 444 U.S. 111 (1979).
,' Id. at 135-36.
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has been construed strictly by the courts, and, unlike
many other statutes of limitations, contains no "savings"
or tolling provisions. 5 ' The rationale for this strict con-
struction is set forth in Simon v. United States:3 52
"[A] statute which in itself creates a new liability, gives an
action to enforce it unknown to the common law, and fixes
the time within which that action may be commenced, is
not a statute of limitations. It is a statute of creation, and
the commencement of the action within the time it fixes is
an indispensable condition of the liability and of the action
which it permits. . . .Such a provision is in other words
jurisdictional rather than a mere statute of limitations. 3 53
Consequently the statute is not tolled during a plaintiff's
minority354 or other disability, 5 5 and is effective to bar
counterclaims against the government.56
The effects of reading the notice and statute of limita-
tions together have been characterized justifiably as "pit-
falls for the practitioner. ' 357  The effect of these
provisions actually appears to shorten the applicable stat-
ute of limitations period in certain situations. For exam-
ple, if a claim is presented two or three weeks after an
accident and denied five months thereafter, it appears that
the claimants must then file suit within six months after
the denial or be forever barred. This is less than a year
after the tort occurred!
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff
may join different parties as defendants in the same law-
suit "if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or
in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or aris-
ing out of the same transaction, occurrence or series of
-15 See infra notes 354-356 and accompanying text.
352 244 F.2d 703, 704-05 (5th Cir. 1957).
Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting 34 AM. JUR. Limitation of Actions § 7 (1941)).
.' United States v. Glenn, 231 F.2d 884, 886-87 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
926 (1956).
15.' Tinkoff v. United States, 211 F.2d 890, 891 (7th Cir. 1954).
. Id. at 892.
.57 Corboy, Shielding the Plaintiffs Achille's Heel. Tort Claim Notices to Governmental
Entities, 28 DE PAUL L. REV. 609, 638 (1979).
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transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or
fact common to defendants will arise in the action.
'3 58
Under this rule, a plaintiff may elect to join other defend-
ants in the action against the United States. If the plaintiff
elects not to sue the United States, but another defendant
seeks contribution or indemnity from the federal govern-
ment and the action is in federal court, the defendant may
implead the United States by filing a third-party com-
plaint.359 No administrative claim is required to implead
the United States, or to file cross-claims or counter-
claims.3 60 This right to implead the United States as a
third-party defendant, however, does not necessarily per-
mit a plaintiff who has not complied with the administra-
tive claim requirements to assert a direct action against the
United States.3 6 ' The FTCA vests the federal courts with
jurisdiction over third-party claims, cross-claims and
counterclaims,36 2 but may not excuse the prerequisite ad-
ministrative procedure in the case of direct claims. 63
When multiple defendants not including the United
States are sued, and federal jurisdiction is lacking, the
lawsuit must be filed in state court.364 If one or more de-
fendants desire to pursue a third-party claim against the
United States for contribution or indemnity, the defend-
ant may be required to institute separate proceedings in
federal court. This stems from the fact that the United
States may be sued only in federal court under the FTCA,
358 FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a).
-59 See FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a). See generally C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1450 (1972 & Supp. 1985) (discussing the requisites
for impleading the United States under Rule 14(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
sw Kennelly, United States in Third-Party Actions in Certification Cases, 17 FORUM
556, 560 (1982).
56, Id.; L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAiMS § 3.06 (Supp. 1977).
362 See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1982).
363 See West v. United States, 592 F.2d 487, 490-91 (8th Cir. 1979); Rosario v.
American Export-Isbrandsten Lines, Inc., 531 F.2d 1227, 1230-34 (3rd Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976).
3C,- Federal jurisdiction depends on the existence of a substantial federal ques-
tion, or sufficient diversity of citizenship and amount in controversy. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331-32 (1982).
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and impleading the United States in state court will not
provide the required removal jurisdiction over the main
action if no independent basis for federal jurisdiction ex-
ists. 365 Under the FTCA scheme, of course, state law still
governs the substantive decision on the merits of the in-
demnity or contribution claim. 66
A. Filing the Administrative Claim - NASA
In filing the administrative claim and attempting to ne-
gotiate a settlement at the administrative level, certain
regulations promulgated by the particular federal agency
involved become significant.3 67 NASA, the obvious target
agency for outer space related accidents, stands as no ex-
ception. Of course, claims against the United States aris-
ing out of NASA functions must be submitted to NASA in
writing within two years after the accident or incident in
order to meet the FTCA notice of claim prerequisites dis-
cussed above.368
The specific NASA regulations governing claims against
NASA or its employees for personal injuries or property
damage provide a dual redress procedure: a special ad-
ministrative procedure and a claims procedure pursuant
to the FTCA. 369 Either procedure apparently will activate
the six-month administrative notice prerequisite to suit
under the FTCA. 370 Claimants should submit NASA-re-
lated claims arising in the United States to the chief coun-
sel of the NASA installation believed responsible for the
365 Morris v. United States, 521 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1975); Ayala v. United States
550 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1977).
3- See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982).
367 This section of text will set forth the NASA administration claim procedure
as an example. Specific agency regulations, however, must be consulted when
instituting any administrative claim. L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS
app. 40 (Supp. 1985), contains specific agency regulations identifying individuals
who possess authority to adjudicate claims. The agency regulations usually iden-
tify the limits that can be settled by various officials. See id.
3, See supra notes 333-356 and accompanying text.
1611 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 1261.3-1261.315 (1985).
370 See supra notes 333-356 for a complete discussion of the administrative no-
tice prerequisite.
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claimed injury, loss or death. 7 ' If there is doubt as to
where the claim should be filed, or if the claim arose in a
foreign country, the claim should be submitted to NASA's
General Counsel in Washington, D.C.3 7 2 A claim will be
deemed presented to NASA, for purposes of tolling the
statute of limitations and satisfying the administrative no-
tice prerequisite under the FTCA, when NASA receives
written notification of the incident or accident, accompa-
nied by a claim for a sum certain. 3 It does not appear
that NASA will act on the claim, however, until the agency
receives a completed Standard Form 95.374 NASA instal-
lations will furnish copies of Standard Form 95 upon re-
quest.375 NASA regulations provide that NASA's General
Counsel will act upon claims in amounts of $10,000 or
more. 376 Claims for amounts less than $10,000 will be
handled by the chief counsel of the field installation in
question or the Assistant General Counsel for Litigation
for NASA Headquarters. 7
The claims procedure outlined in the NASA regulations
authorizes the NASA Administrator to "consider, ascer-
tain, adjust, determine, compromise, and settle any claim
for money damages against the United States for injury or
loss of property or personal injury or death" brought
under the FTCA. 378 In exercising this authority, the Ad-
ministrator must act in accordance with regulations pre-
scribed by the Attorney General of the United States. 79
If a proposed settlement or award exceeds $5,000, NASA
General Counsel must review the award or settlement. 80
-17 14 C.F.R. § 1261.304 (1985).
372 Id.
375 Id. at § 1261.307(c).
374 Id. § 1261.305(a). Standard Form 95 is the standard administrative notice
form used for compliance with the administrative notice prerequisite under the
FTCA. See supra notes 339-343 for a discussion on the advisability of filing this
standard form, even when not technically required.
37.1 14 C.F.R. § 1261.305(b) (1985).
I.71 d. at § 1261.308(a).
.77 Id. at § 1261.308(b).
178 Id. at § 1261.301(a).
."1 Id.
38o 28 C.F.R. § 14.5 (1985).
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Any award or settlement in excess of $25,000 must have
the prior written approval of the Attorney General of the
United States or his designee.3 8 1 As a practical matter,
therefore, most substantial claims under the FTCA involv-
ing NASA will require consultation with the United States
Department of Justice before a settlement or award may
be reached. 8 2 It is important to note that the FTCA pa-
rameters of legal liability apply to this claims
procedure.
Under the special administrative procedure outlined in
the NASA regulations, NASA also has authority under
"42 U.S.C. Section 2473(c)(13)(A) . . . to consider, ascer-
tain, adjust, determine, settle, and pay, on behalf of the
United States, in full satisfaction thereof, any claim for
$25,000 or less against the United States for [injuries to
persons or property] resulting from the conduct of
NASA's functions . . "384 Under this procedure, and at
its discretion, NASA may settle a claim "even though the
United States could not be held legally liable to the claimant.' 3 85
In contrast to the claims procedure, therefore, the admin-
istrative procedure may allow a plaintiff to recover on a
claim for less than $25,000, without meeting the burdens
imposed under the FTCA. 86
Generally, a claim in excess of $25,000 must comply
with the requirements of the FTCA. If the NASA Admin-
istrator considers a claim in excess of $25,000 meritori-
ous, however, NASA may reduce the harshness of the
FTCA by submitting the claim to Congress for its consid-
eration. 87 Any claim submitted to Congress, though, al-
most certainly will not become operational before
exhaustion of all other administrative and judicial
-, Id. at § 14.6.
. See id.
383 See 14 C.F.R. § 1261.301(b) (1985).
384 Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
The plaintiff might be allowed recovery, for example, even if one of the
FTCA exceptions listed in 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1982) might otherwise bar recovery.
",7 14 C.F.R. § 1261.301(c).
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remedies.388
No provisions exist to prevent a claimant from seeking
redress under both the administrative and claims proce-
dures. Many commentators state that the claimant may se-
lect either the special administrative procedure or the
claims procedure, but that failure to designate the statute
under which the claimant is submitting the claim will al-
low NASA the choice to treat the matter under either pro-
cedure.3 8 ' NASA regulations simply state that claims shall
be acted upon pursuant to either the FTCA or the NASA
special administrative procedure "as the NASA official
deems appropriate. 390
The special administrative procedure is significant to
claimants seeking less than $25,000 in that NASA may, in
its discretion, award or settle the claim regardless of
whether the claim meets all of the jurisdictional require-
ments and is actionable under the FTCA.3 9 1 This proce-
dure has been characterized as "quite expedient. 3 92
However, the relatively low ceiling on amounts recover-
able under this administrative procedure will not afford
most claimants an adequate remedy in the case of a cata-
strophic accident involving NASA activities. An adminis-
trative settlement also precludes further liability under
the FTCA since acceptance by a claimant of any "award,
compromise, or settlement" on behalf of any federal
agency constitutes "a complete release of any claim
against the United States. 3 93
If all administrative and judicial remedies prove futile, a
claimant seeking redress against the United States for in-
.-H Wilkins, Substantive Bases for Recovery for Injuries Sustained by Private Individuals
as a Result of Fallen Space Objects, 6J. SPACE L. 161, 166 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Wilkins].
-189 Dula, Regulation of Private Space Activities, 23 JURIMETRICS J. 156, 169 (1982);
Finch, Outer Space Liability: Past, Present and Future, 14 INT'L LAW. 123, 125 (1980);
Wilkins, supra note 388, at 166 n.16.
MX) 14 C.F.R. § 1261.308(d) (1985).
-, Id. at § 1261.301(b).
1112 Gorove, The Space Shuttle: Some of its Features and Legal Implications, 6 ANNALS
OF AIR AND SPACE L., 381, 392 (1981).
.1,1 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1982).
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juries resulting from outer space activities may pursue the
final recourse option of a private bill before Congress.
Congress has unlimited power to provide compensatory
relief; however, actual congressional appropriation would
be unlikely.
V. CONCLUSION
While the United States has consented to liability for
torts "in the same manner and to the same extent as a
private individual under like circumstances, '3 94 the enor-
mous advantages the United States enjoys through vari-
ous limitations on consent to suit have made this
impossible. Specific substantive and procedural excep-
tions, barriers and loopholes confine actionable torts to
certain narrowly-defined situations. While administrative
claims have potential for expeditious processing, and cer-
tain administrative claims (such as the NASA special ad-
ministrative claim) proceed unencumbered by FTCA
limitations, a5 it appears that any expeditious recovery will
be limited to cases involving relatively low amounts of
$25,000 or less. 96 In cases involving more than $25,000,
which probably would include a substantial majority of
any claims arising from outer space activities, the federal
government has shielded itself from liability in a number
of ways.
Unlike many state laws governing claims against private
defendants, the FTCA precludes claims against the gov-
ernment based upon strict or absolute liability. This leads
to a bifurcated approach to federal tort liability. United
States domestic law under the FTCA differs from interna-
tional law which affords claimants the benefit of absolute
liability for damages or injuries suffered by unrelated
third parties in the air or on the surface of the Earth. This
disparity can lead to absurd or unjust results. In injuries
arising out of the same occurrence, foreign claimants may
394 Id. at § 2674.
'95 See supra notes 384-387 and accompanying text.
3'9 See supra notes 386-388 and accompanying text.
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be able to recover damages against the United States
under international law, while United States citizens suf-
fering injuries in the United States may be precluded be-
cause of their inability to plead and prove negligence. 9 7
Furthermore, specific FTCA exceptions or sharply-de-
fined and strictly-construed jurisdictional parameters may
bar FTCA recovery by innocent victims injured or killed
in the same occurrence, simply because of their status as
military personnel or federal employees,398 or because of
failure to file an administrative claim which succumbs to
routine denial in most cases anyway.3 99 These obstacles
to fair redress prejudice not only claimants, but also may
lead to inequitable treatment of other defendants. Even if
the United States government's actions proximately cause
injuries, the myriad of liability exceptions and limitations
make it possible that other joint tortfeasors, such as man-
ufacturers or contractors, because ofjoint and several lia-
bility, may be forced to pay full damages to plaintiffs,
regardless of the joint tortfeasor's actual percentage of
relative fault or culpability.
The United States government thus enjoys protection
on all sides. Users of NASA space vehicles and other gov-
ernment owned or sponsored space equipment come
mostly from military or federal employee ranks. FTCA
limitations typically bar these individuals from suing the
United States.400 The federal government also stands in-
sulated in most cases from claims by manufacturers and
contractors held liable to military servicemen due to de-
fective equipment, even though the facts demonstrate
negligence on the part of the United States as well.40
The Supreme Court reasoned in Stencel Aero Engineering
Corp. v. United States402 that FTCA-based indemnity would
317 See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
39)8 See supra notes 140-155 and accompanying text.
3W' See supra notes 333-337 and accompanying text.
4oSee Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140-46 (1950); see supra notes 138-
147 and accompanying text.
10, See infra notes 402-406 and accompanying text.
41,2 See Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 670-74 (1977).
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subject the government to varying degrees of liability, de-
pending upon the situs of the accident.40 3 Such indemnity
also would require the United States to pay indirectly to
servicemen what the ceiling limits in the Veterans' Bene-
fits Act 40 4 forbid the government to pay directly, and
would interfere with military discipline.40 5 Stencel reaffirms
traditional governmental insulation from FTCA liability
to a serviceman who makes a claim directly against the
federal government, and also expands this protection to
third party indemnity claims against the federal govern-
ment, despite clear proof of negligence on the part of the
federal government. Decisions like Stencel highlight the re-
ality that the United States is, in fact, not treated as a "pri-
vate individual under like circumstances," despite the
explicit assertion to the contrary in the language of the
FTCA.4 °6
This broad governmental immunity also has spilled into
403 Id. at 672.
4- 38 U.S.C. §§ 301-423 (1982).
40-. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 672-73.
406 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982). It should be noted that the United States Supreme
Court recently approved, for the first time, a third-party action against the United
States following injury to a civilian employee of the federal government. In Lock-
heed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 460 U.S. 190 (1983), a civilian employee of
the United States Navy died in the crash of an aircraft operated by the United
States Air Force and manufactured by Lockheed. Id. at 191. The United States
paid death benefits to the employee's survivors under the Federal Employees'
Compensation Act (FECA). Id. See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-93 (1982). The
employee's administrator filed suit against Lockheed in federal district court,
seeking damages for the employee's wrongful death and for injuries suffered prior
to her death. Lockheed, 460 U.S. at 191-92. Lockheed filed a third-party action
against the United States, claiming a right to indemnification under the FTCA. Id.
at 192.
Lockheed settled the claim of the administrator and moved for summary judg-
ment in the third-party action. Id. The Government moved to dismiss on the
ground that the exclusive liability provision of FECA barred the third-party ac-
tion. Id. The FECA exclusive liability provision states:
The liability of the United States . . . under [FECAl with respect to
the injury or death of an employee is exclusive and instead of all
other liability of the United States . . . to the employee, his legal
representative, spouse, dependents, next of kin, and any other per-
son otherwise entitled to recover damages from the United States
* * . because of the injury or death . ...
5 U.S.C. § 8116(c).
The Supreme Court held that the exclusive liability provision of the FECA did
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the private sector. Private manufacturers have benefited
enormously by the wide shield of immunity enjoyed by
the government under the government contractor de-
fense.40 7 The government contractor defense is a judi-
cially-created concept which, in certain instances,
provides immunity for design defects when the contractor
performs the work according to government specifica-
tions.4 ° s This defense is being asserted with increasing
frequency in product liability actions filed against govern-
ment contractors for the death of servicemen.
In McKay v. Rockwell International Corp. ,4o9 the widows of
two Navy pilots killed in two unrelated crashes of RA-5C
naval aircraft filed wrongful death actions against the
manufacturer of the aircraft and its ejection system.4 10
The court held that a supplier of military equipment is not
subject to strict liability to an injured serviceman or his
heirs, if the United States government set specifications
for the equipment in question or approved a manufac-
turer's reasonably precise specifications. 41 1  The court
reasoned that subjecting government suppliers to strict li-
ability might undermine the FTCA statutory scheme by
shifting to the government the cost of judgments against
not directly bar a third-party indemnity action against the United States. Lockheed,
460 U.S. at 199.
The Lockheed decision could have considerable practical ramifications in a prod-
ucts liability suit against manufacturers arising from an outer space related acci-
dent involving an injured or deceased civilian employee or other third parties.
Under the FTCA mandate for application of the substantive law of the situs state,
manufacturers in such cases may recover all or part of their payments to plaintiffs
through application of state contribution or indemnity laws. However, it must be
emphasized that the Lockheed holding is limited, stating that FECA's exclusivity
provision does not directly bar a third-party indemnity (or contribution) action
against the United States. See id. Applicable state law may continue to indirectly
bar efforts of manufacturers seeking indemnity from the United States. State in-
demnity and contribution laws vary widely from state to state. See generally, Note,
Lockheed Aircraft Co~p. v. United States: Its Impact on Indemnity Actions Against the Federal
Government in Asbestos Exposure Cases, 19 FORUM 489, 495-99 (1984).
407 See infra notes 408-422.
408 See McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 448-49 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1985).
4 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1985).
410 Id. at 446.
41 Id. at 451.
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manufacturers through cost overruns, contract prices re-
flecting the cost of liability insurance or higher prices in
later equipment sales.4 1 2 Holding military suppliers liable
for federally approved designs also would raise separation
of powers problems by interjecting the judiciary into mili-
tary decision-making." A third rationale underlying the
court's decision is that military production necessarily re-
quires manufacturers to push technology toward its limits,
thereby incurring risks beyond those which would be ac-
ceptable for ordinary consumer goods.4 14 The court also
suggested that immunity from strict liability for govern-
ment-specified-or-approved designs would motivate mili-
tary suppliers to work closely and consult with military
authorities in developing and testing equipment.4t 5 Fi-
nally, the policy considerations underlying strict liability
- enterprise liability, market deterrence, compensation
and implied representation of safety - do not apply to
military equipment.41 6
It is important to note, however, that significant limita-
tions may exist on the extent to which the government
contractor defense affords immunity to private defend-
ants, even under the reasoning in McKay. First, the McKay
court consistently refers to "military equipment. ' 41 7 This
raises questions about whether equipment and products
contracted for by the government for outer space activi-
ties will be considered "military equipment" if this equip-
ment is used by civilian agencies of the federal
government or if this equipment serves a dual civil-
ian/military role.4 8 Second, it should be emphasized that
412 Id. at 449.
4, See id.
1 See id. at 449-50.
415 See id. at 450.
416 See id. at 451-53.
4,7 See id. at 448-53.
4' It will be interesting to see what effect the recent Supreme Court decision in
Lockheed, discussed supra note 406, may have on the government contractor de-
fense in suits instituted by civilians who may be injured or killed by a military prod-
uct which fails due to a design defect. McKay involved claims by families of
servicemen, nol civilians. McKay, 704 F.2d at 446. It also will be interesting to moni-
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the government contractor defense applies to design de-
fects, not manufacturing defects. 419 The court explicitly
stated, "the rule enunciated here does not relieve suppli-
ers of military equipment of liability for defects in the
manufacture of that equipment. '420  Finally, the applica-
bility of the government contractor defense is a matter of
state law, not federal law,42' and some jurisdictions have
flatly rejected the doctrine.4 22
Government is involved either directly or indirectly in
virtually every aspect of outer space activity. The practical
effects of legal limitations on governmental liability and
consent to suit, however, often shield the United States
government from any tort liability connected with this in-
volvement. This broad shield has been extended to the
private sector in some cases. In most cases, though, the
private sector will not enjoy comparable immunity and
will be forced to pay disproportionate damages to injured
third parties. In cases where sole culpability rests with the
United States, but one of the FTCA exceptions shields the
government from having to pay fair compensation, the in-
nocent victim ultimately will suffer the loss (although the
possibility of recovery from the United States may still ex-
ist for injured foreign nationals under the Liability
Convention).
Despite judicial assertions that the FTCA should be
construed to equate the liability of the United States to
that which "a private individual" would have "under like
circumstances, ' 4 23 such constructions have been rare.
And while the language of the FTCA plainly states, "[t]he
tor the success of attempts to extend the McKay holdings to claims by civilians
injured due to dangerous defects in the design of military equipment.
41 See id. at 448-51.
420 Id. at 451.
42, See Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 696 F.2d 246, 249 (3d Cir. 1982).
422 See, e.g., Challoner v. Day and Zimmermann, Inc., 512 F.2d 77, 84 (5th Cir.),
vacated on other grounds, 423 U.S. 3 (1975); Foster v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 502
F.2d 867, 869 (8th Cir. 1974).
423 See Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62, 73-79 (D.C. Cir.
1955), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds, United States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S.
907, modified on other grounds, 350 U.S. 962 (1956).
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United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of
this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances...
,,424 a thorough analysis of existing case law suggests a
sometimes contrary reality. In summary, many of the
FTCA protections the United States enjoys for its tradi-
tional terrestrial activities almost certainly will be ex-
tended to outer space related conduct as well. One can
only hope that the new technology will stir Congress and
the courts to reassess the often archaic reasoning which
underlies many of these traditional liability limitations.
4 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982).
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ADDENDUM
On January 28, 1986, several weeks after the main text
of this article was submitted for publication, shock
gripped the United States and the world as people every-
where watched or heard of the Space Shuttle Challenger
tragedy. The Challenger accident, unparalleled in space
exploration history, ultimately may raise some of the same
questions addressed in the main text of this article. In
keeping with the pioneering spirit for which the Challenger
crew members sacrificed their lives, the author believes it
appropriate to briefly explore some of the main issues
which may arise as a result of this tragedy. Just as the
deaths of these seven brave men and women will lead to a
review and improvement of the present application of
technology and procedures, it also will illustrate the legal
inadequacies and injustices of the present compensation
system in the United States for claims against the federal
government and private contractors in connection with an
outer space related accident. At present, the cause of the
Shuttle disaster has not been determined. Consequently,
this addendum seeks only to identify the main issues likely
to arise and illustrate some of the inadequacies of the
present legal system. Nowhere is blame or fault implied.
Any litigation brought in the United States involving
multiple plaintiffs and multiple defendants, including
manufacturers, component parts manufacturers and the
United States government, can present difficult and some-
times insoluble legal problems. This stems largely from
the fact that no uniform system of national legislation ex-
ists to preempt the myriad of contradictory laws and con-
fusing precedents currently in force.4 25 In most complex
tort litigation, multiple forums will be available-each
containing different substantive law and choice of law
rules. Consequently, initial battles between plaintiffs and
defendants invariably will be procedural in nature, with
42 Even the Federal Tort Claims Act, for example, requires resort to the sub-
stantive tort law of the place where the tortious conduct occurred. See supra note
84.
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each combatant fighting for the forum and laws most
favorable to his position. These preliminary battles typi-
cally involve questions concerning jurisdiction, conflict of
laws and proper venue.426 Unfortunately, ultimate resolu-
tion of these issues is often difficult or impossible to pre-
dict, as well as time-consuming and expensive. After
these initial issues common to most complex litigation are
resolved, any legal analysis of this particular tragedy illus-
trates further inadequacies.
Since five of the seven crew members aboard the Chal-
lenger were either military servicemen or federal employ-
ees, the Feres doctrine or FECA, respectively, almost
certainly would preclude any action against the United
States government on behalf of the survivors or estates of
these crewmen.427 Their remedies vis-a-vis the federal
government probably will be limited to federal workmen's
compensation-type statutes which provide relatively mod-
est redress. 428 FTCA actions against the federal govern-
ment by the survivors or estates of the two privately-
employed crewmen are allowed, but, in order to be suc-
cessful, must overcome a number of barriers and other
privileges afforded only to the United States when it is a
defendant and not to other defendants. Some of these
additional requirements include compliance with adminis-
trative notice requirements, regardless of actual notice 4 29 ;
compliance with a prerequisite administrative claims pro-
cedure430 ; and overcoming the limited jurisdictional pa-
rameters of the FTCA,4 3' including but not limited to the
discretionary function exception,432 the suits in admiralty
exception,43 3 and, perhaps, the foreign country excep-
426 See supra notes 103-116 and accompanying text (discussing choice of law and
venue provisions applicable under the FTCA).
427 See supra notes 140-155 and accompanying text.
428 See supra notes 144,152-155 and accompanying text.
421) See supra notes 333-363 and accompanying text.
430 See supra notes 367-393 and accompanying text.
43" See supra notes 118-330 and accompanying text.
4.32 See supra notes 158-212 and accompanying text.
483 See supra notes 213-266 and accompanying text.
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tion. 4  The plaintiffs also must plead and prove negli-
gence. 43 15 FTCA actions cannot be based upon strict or
absolute liability theories,43 6 even though the United
States would be absolutely liable for any injuries to for-
eign nationals not involved in launch activities, 4 7 and
even though private defendants may be liable under strict
liability theories. In addition, these plaintiffs are pre-
cluded from recovering pre-judgment interest or punitive
damages from the federal government regardless of appli-
cable state law.43 8
In contrast, private defendants enjoy none of these
privileges and protections. Consequently, from a legal
perspective, private entities such as contractors and man-
ufacturers become very attractive defendants. And even
though these entities may be guilty of only a relatively
small percentage of fault as compared to the federal gov-
ernment, rules of joint and several liability may subject
them to liability for the total amount of damages. A fur-
ther contrast is that all claimants, not just the survivors or
estates of the two privately-employed crewmen, may
maintain an action against the manufacturers and contrac-
tors. And because of the liberal strict liability laws which
exist in most jurisdictions, a plaintiff's burden of proof
against these private defendants is greatly reduced as
compared to the burden in an action against the United
States, which requires proof of negligence.
This tragedy is a real life illustration of the legal inade-
quacies and inconsistencies which presently exist under
the United States compensation system as applied to a
space related accident. It is indisputable that such incon-
sistencies in the law, as it applies to different claimants or
defendants, inevitably will lead to absurd results. It is
hoped that the families of these seven brave astronauts
434 See supra notes 267-330 and accompanying text.
43-5 See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
436 Id.
431 See supra note 96.
4.4. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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will be afforded prompt and adequate redress no matter
how inadequate or inconsistent the present system ap-
pears. It would be unrealistic, however, to expect any im-
mediate changes in the present compensation system, as it
applies to outer space activities, to emerge as a result of
this tragedy. Respected practitioners have long criticized
the present tort compensation system as applied to com-
plex or transitory tort litigation. They have stated that
tort litigation arising out of a disaster involving multiple
plaintiffs or defendants is often "marked by mystery, con-
fusion, and inconsistencies. ' ' 439 They have criticized the
present system as "outmoded, anachronistic, and fre-
quently unworkable"44 and a " 'tortured, torturous and
even torturing tort system.' ", 44' Various solutions have
been proposed such as establishment of uniform legisla-
tion 4 42 or replacement of the present system with a no-
fault plan.44 3 Irrespective of the merits of such plans and
the unquestioned need for change, these plans have not
been adopted because of opposition from various interest
groups. Unfortunately, it appears that the same unwork-
able and inconsistent system will apply to outer space and
outer space related activities.
While the entities involved in America's space program
are reviewing diligently the present application of tech-
nology and procedure to prevent a recurrence of this
tragedy, it is unrealistic to expect the same amount of re-
examination or results to occur in the application of the
law relating to such a disaster. While engineers and scien-
tists work on the problems and root causes of this disas-
439 Kennelly, Litigation Implications of the Chicago O'Hare Airport Crash of American
Airlines Flight 191, 15J. MAR. L. REv. 273, 316 (1984).
440 Id.
41 Chalk, A New Proposalfor the Reform of Commercial Air Crash Litigation, 50J. AIR
L. & CoM. 219 (1985) (quoting J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY-No
FAULT INSURANCE FOR PRODUCTS AND SERVICES 67 (1975)).
442 See Kennelly, Aviation-The Need for Uniform Legislation: A Proposed Federal Solo-
tion, 38 J. AIR L. & COM. 613 (1983); Cocia, Uniform Product Liability Legislation: A
Proposed Federal Solution, 1983 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 236.
4. See J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY-No FAULT INSURANCE FOR
PRODUCTS AND SERVICES 67 (1975).
1986] GOVERNMENT LIABILITY 895
ter, we in the legal community must remember that any
review or examination of the applicable compensation
system will rest largely with us.

